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Since 1990, four state supreme courts have interpreted
their state constitutions to provide greater protection for
religious exercise than is available under the Federal
Constitution.' Prompting this interpretive independence was
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith: a decision that has been widely criticized
as the virtual repeal of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall Law School. The author would like to thank
Judge John Gibbons, Eugene Gressman, Catherine McCauliff, and John Wefing for
many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks are given to
Seton Hall Law School Dean Ronald Riccio and Associate Dean Michael Zimmer for
providing research support. Jodi Friend, Sandra Helewa and James Tonrey deserve
special thanks for their research assistance.
1. See infra notes 21-38, 161-187 and accompanying text.
2.
494 U.S. 872 (1990). See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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A~nendment.~
In this article, I attempt to sketch the contours of an
emerging post-Smith jurisprudence of state constitutions in
light of both prior state interpretation and the "new judicial
federalism.'" I also urge state courts to reject Smith in order to
attain three important goals: fwst, to ensure the immediate
protection of religious exercise within each state; second, to
promote a dialogue among state courts and between state
courts and the Supreme Court on the meaning of religious
1ibe1-t~;~
and third, to encourage the development of coherent
interpretations of the relationship of religious exercise to
di~establishment.~
Smith has ushered in a period of crisis in
which a fundamental national value-religious liberty-has
lost its substantive meaning.' While we may be reluctant to
encourage multiple state standards of protection: shifting
interpretive activity to the states may produce a more robust
understanding of religious liberty, and ultimately serve to
reinvigorate federal free exercise jurisprudence.

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
3.
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I (commonly
referred to as the Religion Clauses, or separately, as the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause).
4.
See infia notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the role of state constitutional interpretation in dialogue
5.
with federal constitutional interpretation, see generally G. ALANTARR& MARYC.A.
PORTER, STATE SUPREMECOURTSIN STATE AND NATION (1988); William J.
B r e ~ a n Jr.,
, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977).
G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 78
6.
(1989).
7.
Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 477, 536-37 (1991). Glendon and Yanes criticize the federal interpretive
process for failing to "code] to grips with basic questions about the meaning and
purpose of the Religion Clause in the light of text and tradition." Id. at 549.
Religious exercise is protected through a "complex interplay of free exercise, free
speech and equal protection." Id. When state constitutions are added to the
&-independently
and
in
dialogue
with
the
federal
interpretive
process-additional texts and traditions, and thus additional meanings are brought
to the discussion, and a richer interplay of provisions and narratives result. The
success of such an interpretive project depends upon comprehensive treatment; a
dialogue over the meaning of religious liberty must include a comprehensive
treatment of the "relations within and among texts." Id. at 537.
8.
To the extent I once found independent state constitutional interpretation
troubling, I have changed my mind. Cfi Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship
and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and
Architectural Review, 36 VIU. L. REV. 401, 477 (1991).
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The Supreme Court, in its 1963 decision in Sherbert u.
Verner, ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or
punishes religious belief or conduct must be subjected to strict
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amend~nent.~
The Court in Sherbert and in subsequent cases
held that when government action burdens, even inadvertently,
a sincerely held religious belief or practice, the state must
justify the burden by demonstrating that the law embodies a
compelling interest, that no less restrictive alternative exists,
and that a religious exemption would impair the state's ability
to effectuate its compelling interest.'' As in other instances of
state action affecting fundamental rights, negative impacts on
those rights demand the highest level of judicial scmtiny."
After Sherbert, this strict scrutiny balancing test resulted in
court-mandated religious exemptions from facially neutral laws
of general application whenever unjustified burdens were
found.
But Sherbert's analytical framework was discarded in 1990
when the Court decided Employment Division v. Smith.12
With a sweeping opinion that overturned settled law, the Court
abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review in all
but a few categories of free exercise cases.13 According to
9.
374 U.S. 398, 402-10 (1963). The strict scrutiny standard of judicial review
replaced the minimum rationality standard. In this case, Adele Sherbert, a
Seventh-day Adventist, was denied unemployment compensation because she would
not take a job that required work on Saturday, her Sabbath. The Supreme Court
held that a burden on religious practice had to be justified by a compelling state
interest. With respect to Sherbert, the state's interest was not considered
sufficiently compelling, and so the state was required to pay Mrs. Sherbert
unemployment compensation. Id.
10. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 474 (1965) (state cannot
criminalize use of contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (state
cannot sterilize some criminals and imprison others).
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Plaintiffs were discharged from their jobs with a
private drug counseling organization because they ingested peyote in a religious
ceremony of the Native American Church. The Supreme Court determined that the
State's prohibition of ritual peyote use under generally applicable and facially
neutral law was constitutional. Thus, since dismissal resulted from peyote use, the
State's denial of unemployment compensation was likewise constitutional.
13. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-82, 885. Smith leaves some room for a higher
standard of review. In cases of individualized assessment (where exemptions are
granted on a case-by-case basis) and in cases of hybrid rights (where free exercise
together with some other constitutional right, such as free speech or association, is
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Smith, a generally applicable, facially neutral law cannot
violate the Free Exercise Clause, no matter how great a burden
to religious exercise, and no matter how insignificant the
state's interest. To be constitutionally suspect, a law must
target religion. Thus, a bright-line test has been chosen over
Sherbert's balancing test; a minimum rationality standard of
judicial review has replaced strict scrutiny; and any general
law that is formally neutral satisfies the minimum rationality
test.14 Legislative exemptions are acceptable, but the
opportunity for courts to mandate religious exemptions under
the U.S. Constitution is severely limited. Not surprisingly, a
tremendous amount of scholarly criticism has emerged
following the Smith decision.15
Smith is dangerous precedent because it subordinates
fundamental rights of religious belief and ,practice to all
neutral, general legislation. Sherbert recognized the need to
protect religious exercise in light of the massive increase in the
size of government, the concerns within its reach, and the
number of laws administered by it. However, Smith abandons
the protection of religious exercise a t a time when the scope
and reach of government has never been greater. Professor
Douglas Laycock points out that Smith creates the legal
framework for persecution: through general, neutral laws,
legislatures are now able to force -conformity on religious
minorities whose practices irritate or frighten an intolerant
majority.16 But there need not be actual animus in such
general laws for the implications of Smith to cause alarm:
Smith also creates the framework for ignoring religious persons
and groups, and for crushing religious exercise and doctrinal
development under the weight of general and neutral laws. By
permitting the state to ignore a n entire dimension of human
activity and meaning, Smith has made the state's political
processes the unwitting, yet final arbiter of permissible
religious conduct.17

implicated), strict scrutiny will continue to be employed. Id. at 881-82, 884.
14.
See Michael W. M c C o ~ e l l , Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1990).
15.
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious
Liberty, 60 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 841 (1992) [hereinafter Laycock, Summary];
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Ezercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter
Laycock, Remnants]; M c C o ~ e l l supra
,
note 14.
Laycock, Remnants, supra note 15, at 54.
16.
17.
See generally Angela C. Carmella, The Religion Clauses and Acculturated
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Scholars initially thought that the categories left open in
Smith for continued application of strict scrutiny might be
interpreted vigorously by the lower federal courts as a way to
avoid Smith's harsh result. Instead, there has been steady use
of the new bright-line test of facial neutrality and general
applicability.18 Another proposal for avoiding Smith's harsh
result is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, now pending
before Congress.lS This federal law, if passed, would create a
statutory cause of action for claimants whose religious exercise
is burdened and would require the government to demonstrate
a compelling interest and no less restrictive alternative.
Another route to the "restoration" of strict scrutiny
protection for religious exercise cases is state constitutional
interpretation. In fact, since Smith was decided, state courts
have been quite active: while the high courts of Oregon and
Vermont have expressly followed Smith's lower standard,zO
the supreme courts of Minnesota, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Washington have instead found an independent basis for the
strict scrutiny standard in their state constitution^.^'
Religious Conduct: Boundaries for the Regulation of Religion, in THE ROLE OF
AND REGULATING
RELIGIONIN PUBLIC LIFE (James E.
GOVERNMENT
IN MONITORING
Wood, Jr. ed., 1993).
18. See Ryan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992); Living Faith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d
365 (7th Cir. 1991); American Friends Sew. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941 F.2d
808 (9th Cir. 1991); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991); Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd.
of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991); Salvation Army v. Department of
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990); Church of Scientology Flag Servs.
Org. Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498 (M.D. Fla. 1991); United States
v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc'y of Friends, 753 F. Supp. 1300
(ED.Pa. 1990); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 W.D. Mich.
1990), affd, 940. F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1991); Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845,
withdrawn, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990); see also People ex rel. Meyer v.
LaPorte Church of Christ, 830 P.2d 1150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Health Servs. Div.
v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130 (NM. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 814 P.2d 103
(N-M. 1991).
19. H.R. 1308 & S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill passed the
House on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG.REC. H.356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993), and
it was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of
15 to 1, 139 CONG.REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1993, a t A9.
20.
See infia notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
21.
Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992); Society of Jesus v.
Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); State v. Hershberger,
462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Mim. 1990); First
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).

280

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

Presently, the Supreme Court of California has pending before
it a case in which it will decide whether its own constitution
requires the Sherbert standard.22 In addition, a proposal to
amend the Utah Constitution is currently being debated which
would explicitly constitutionalize the compelling interest test of
Sherbert.23
The state supreme courts of Minnesota, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Washington, which currently require strict
scrutiny, have all based their departures from Smith on their
own states' constitutional language. Unlike the religion clauses
of the First Amendment, the texts of these four state
constitutions are very detailed. Each contains statements about
the right to religious exercise, but in each constitution such a
right is qualified by a "proviso," that is, a statement of the
government interests capable of infringing on the protected
religious exercise. Minnesota and Washington have identical
provisos: "the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state."24 Maine
and Massachusetts have a similar proviso which allows for the
22.
Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct.
App. 1991), reh'g granted & opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (1992).
23.
Utah Senate Joint Resolution 8 passed the Senate and was narrowly
defeated in the Utah House; however, it will be reconsidered next year. There was
no genuine controversy over the compelling state interest provision of the proposed
constitutional amendment.
24.
The M i ~ e s o t aConstitution reads as follows:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled
to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any
control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or
any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of
worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from
the treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or
theological seminaries.
MINN. CONST.art. I, 8 16 (emphasis added). The Washington State Constitution
reads as follows:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment,
belief, and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one
shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of
religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace and safety of the state.
WASH. CONS. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).
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protection of religious exercise "provided that that person does
not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their
religious worship."25
From the interpretations given to these provisos, a postSmith jurisprudence has begun to emerge. Such provisos are
critical to the restoration of the strict scrutiny standard
because they can be interpreted t o represent the compelling
interest/least restrictive alternative element of the Sherbert
balancing test? In fact, they have even been interpreted
quite literally to mean that the religious conduct at issue must
be permitted unless the proviso authorizes the state to prevent
it.27
Minnesota's Supreme Court was the first state supreme
court to take a stand against the new standard of judicial
review, doing so twice within just seven months of Smith. The
court first refused t o follow Smith in Cooper v. French.28It
had a second opportunity when the U.S. Supreme Court
ordered reconsideration of its 1989 State v. Hershberger
decision (Hershberger I ) "in light of" Smith.2gOn remand, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v. Hershberger
(Hershberger II) that it would not interpret the Federal
Constitution, given the "uncertainty" in the Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence in the wake of Smith.3oIn its stead, the
The Maine Constitution provides:
All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no person
shall be hurt, molested or restrained in that person's liberty or estate for
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates
of that person's own conscience, nor for that person's religious professions
or sentiments, provided that that person does m t disturb the public peace,
nor obstruct others in their religious worship.
CONST.art. 1, 5 3 (emphasis added). The Massachusetts Constitution reads:
[Nlo subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty,
or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or
sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct
others in their religious worship.
MASS. CONST.pt. I, art. II (emphasis added). ,
26.
See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
27.
See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
28.
460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
29.
State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901
(1990).
30.
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). This is particularly
ironic given the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court forced the Minnesota
Supreme Court in 1963 to use strict scrutiny in In re Jenison Contempt
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court chose to employ the religious liberty provision of the
Minnesota Constitution.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was next to
stand against Smith, holding at the end of 1990 in Society of
Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission that its own
constitution provided free exercise protection. However, it chose
an approach different from Minnesota's. Rather than make
explicit its discomfort with Smith, the court simply analyzed its
own constitution and, without mentioning Smith or any other
federal case, never reached the federal issue.31
The high courts of Maine and Washington have analyzed
both state and federal constitutions in the post-Smith era, and
each has explicitly employed an independent standard of
review for its state constitution. Maine's Supreme Court, in
Rupert v. City of Portland,s2 required the state to demonstrate
a compelling governmental interest under its own constitution.
The Washington Supreme Court decided First Covenant Church
v. City of Seattle (First Covenant Church I) on a dual
interpretation of state and federal free exercise provisions only
weeks before Smith.33 The U.S. Supreme Court shortly
thereafter ordered reconsideration of First Covenant Church I
in light of Smith. On remand, the Washington Supreme Court,
in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle (First Covenant
Church II), employed strict scrutiny under its own
con~titution.~~
It found that Smith had created uncertainty;
that it had departed from a long history of established law by
adopting a test that placed free exercise in a subordinate,
instead of preferred, position; that it had improperly relied on
an overruled decision; and that it had accepted a disadvantaged
status for minority religions, directly contrary t o state positions
on the issue.35 Since Washington 'State had long before
rejected the idea that the political majority may control
Proceedings, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963) through ordering reconsideration in light
of Sherbert. See infia notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
31.
Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990).
32.
605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992). The court applied its 1988 holding in Blount v.
Department of Education & Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988).
33.
787 P.2d 1352 (Wash.), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1990).
34.
840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). The Washington Supreme Court employed a
compelling governmental interest test under its state constitution and under the
Federal Constitution. It justified the use of strict scrutiny in the latter analysis by
finding that the categories in Smith that continued to enjoy strict scrutiny were
applicable here. See supra note 13.
35.
Id. at 185-87.
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minority rights, it rejected the reasoning and outcome of Smith.
The texts of the four state constitutions just discussed
recognize free exercise rights unless such exercise threatens the
public peace or safety, disturbs other worshippers, or causes
licentious behavior.36The supreme courts in these states have
interpreted these provisos in ways that drastically limit the
methods by which their respective governments can regulate or
influence religion. The provisos have been understood to
require a religious exemption in the absence of a compelling
'
Smith, Minnesota, Washington and
state i n t e r e ~ t . ~Since
Maine have interpreted their state texts to represent the
federal Sherbert analysis.
By contrast, Massachusetts, and the concurring opinion in
Washington's First Covenant Church II decision, have engaged
in a very different analysis of their provisos. They have chosen
not to adopt Sherbert's federal language of compelling state
interest, but instead apply a rather literal, homegrown
approach. They ask if the interest the state is trying to promote
falls within a category listed on the face of the proviso. If it
does not, the government regulation must yield. Therefore,
under this interpretation, their constitutions categorically
prohibit state restraints on religion when provisos are
inapplicable-no
balancing is necessary. However, i n
Massachusetts, even if the proviso is applicable, the state
interest does not automatically prevail. At that point, the court
enters into the balancing test. Such close readings of
constitutional texts, combined with strict scrutiny balancing,
have the potential to severely limit the scope of state interests
that can overbalance religious freedom, and to protect religious
exercise via exemptions from laws that do not promote those
narrow categories of state ir~terest.~'
The California Supreme Court cumently has pending
before it a case in which it can choose either to follow federal

36.
RONALDK.L. COUINS, THE AMERICAN
BENCH,1985186, at 2496-99 (1986);
Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers, Religious Free Exercise Under State
Constitutions, 34 J. CHURCH& ST. 303, 320-23 (1992).
37.
This interpretation is consistent with the analysis suggested by Professor
Michael W. McComell in The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1455-66 (1990).
38.
Because Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission, 564 N.E.2d 571
(1990), and Justice Utter's concurrence in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,
840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992), are text-bound, they might have a limited influence on
dialogue nationwide.
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precedent and apply Smith, or to depart from Smith and follow
its own constitutional provisions on religious liberty. The
experiences of Minnesota and Washington are particularly
important because the California constitution shares identical
proviso language.3g
The return to a Sherbert analysis, or its equivalent, is
further justified by another unique aspect of the state
constitutional texts: the common use of explicitly religious
language. Many of the free exercise provisions are themselves
acknowledgments of the right to worship God according t o the
dictates of one's conscience. In the preambles to forty-five state
constitutions, the sovereign people invoke a higher authority,
thereby acknowledging an authority prior to
usually God:'
the state, prior to the law, and prior to thernselves.*l They
recognize that religious liberty is a prepolitical, fundamental
human right. When the constitution acknowledges that
religious duties may take precedence over other duties, and
that rights to religious exercise are not derived from the state
but exist prior to it, religious exemptions in the absence of
overriding state interests make sense.42 Thus; such express
recognition of a transcendent authority prior to the state is, in
itself, a significant justification for religious exemptions.
FEDERALISM
AND FREEEXERCISE
111. THENEWJUDICIAL
Reliance on state constitutions in the free exercise area is

39.
CAL. CONST.art. I, 5 4 reads a s follows: "Free exercise and enjoyment of
religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This liberty of
conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the State."
Mechthild Fritz, Religion in a Federal System: Diversity Versus Uniformity,
40.
38 KAN. L. REV.39, 42-43 (1989). The preamble to the New Jersey Constitution of
1947, representative of many preambles, begins:
We, the people of the State of New Jersey, gratefbl to Almighty God for
the civil and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted u s to
enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure
and transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations, do ordain
and establish this Constitution.
N.J. CONST.pmbl.
A constitution is the direct act of the sovereign people, and state
41.
constitutions limit the otherwise plenary power of the state government t o do
anything not forbidden by federal law. James A. Gardner, The Faikd Discourse of
State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 814-16 (1992).
42.
Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV.149, 156-66 (1991); see also M c C o ~ e l l ,supra note
37, a t 1513-17.
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part of a larger jurisprudential movement scholars call the
"new judicial federali~m.'"~During the last twenty years,
there has been a resurgence of interest in state constitutional
interpretation as a tool for providing greater protection for
rights than is available under the Federal Constitution. State
supreme courts have actively provided greater civil liberties
than the U.S. Supreme Court in areas of criminal law and free
speech ever since the Warren Court heyday of individual rights
ended.44
Under principles of federalism, state courts have
tremendous interpretive autonomy regarding individual and
group rights.45Each state has its own constitution, and the
state supreme court is the final arbiter of its meaning. The
substance of the interpretation can track the federal courts'
interpretation of the comparable federal provision or it can
differ significantly.46 But even though it can differ, the
interpretation of state law cannot conflict with federal law:'
Acknowledging additional rights under state constitutions does
not cause conflicts; only an attempt to reduce rights recognized
in the federal constitution will do so. If no conflict exists, the
state's ruling on its own constitution is authoritative and final,
and cannot be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the
case of a conflict, the state supreme court's ruling is subject t o
U.S. Supreme Court review where the federal interpretation
will govern the outcome of the litigati~n.~'

43.
See TARR& PORTER,supra note 5, a t 2 n.4.
44.
See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535
(1986) [hereinafter Breman, Guardians of Individual Rights]; B r e ~ a n supra
,
note
5. The success of the new judicial federalism is the topic of some debate, with
some commentators seeing the glass half full and others seeing i t half empty.
Compare Gardner, supra note 41, with Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie,
Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional
Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1986).
45.
JENNIFER
FREISEN,STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: LITIGATINGINDMDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMSAND DEFENSES(1992); Brennan, Guardians of Individual Rights,
,
note 5, a t 500-02.
supra note 44, a t 501; B r e ~ a n supm
46.
TARR& PORTER,supra note 5, a t 7-8.
47.
Id. "Conflict" refers only to those situations in which the state
interpretation yields less protection from government encroachment than does the
federal understanding.
Id.; Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 W M . &
48.
MARYL. REV. 169, 182 (1983). This result is mandated by the Supremacy Clause,
which reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
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All this assumes that the state court makes clear that it is
interpreting its own constitution. In Society of Jesus v. Boston
Landmarks Commission, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts interpreted its own fundamental law and never
reached the federal constitutional claim. The court made it
absolutely clear that it was rendering a final opinion on its own
state constitutional law. But in analyses that discuss both
federal and state constitutions, confusion often exists over
whether the decision is based on state or federal grounds. The
U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision on
state grounds that is not otherwise in conflict with federal law;
but it does have jurisdiction to review any state court decision
based on federal law because state courts must interpret that
law in accordance with federal precedentPg
Since its landmark decision in Michigan v. Long,50 the
U.S. Supreme Court has presumed that state court decisions
involving common constitutional protections are interpretations
of the federal provision (and thereby within its jurisdiction)
unless the state court has made an explicit statement that the
decision is based upon "independent and adequate state
grounds."51The general rule is that if a state court concludes
that both federal and state constitutions are violated, the final
state court decision is not r e ~ i e w a b l e But
. ~ ~ the state court
exposes itself to review if, when it finds a violation of both
constitutions, it is unclear as to how the state ground stands
independent of the federal one (particularly if it relies wholly

the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST.art. VI.
49.
TARR& PORTER,supra note 5, at 8-9.
50.
463 US. 1032 (1983).
Id. at 1037. The state court is required to provide a plain statement that
51.
its decision is grounded in the adequate and independent interpretation of its own
constitution. "Otherwise, the Court will assume it has the jurisdiction to review
when the state decision is primarily determined by federal law, when it is
interwoven with federal law, when national precedents are cited other than for
purposes of guidance, or when such precedents are said to compel the result
reached." Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Jdicial Federalism: The Interplay of National State Standards, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTION IN
CONSTITUTIONAL
POLICYMAKING18 (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988). Other
ways of asserting interpretive independence include distinguishing facts and taking
advantage of ambiguities in federal precedent. TARR& PORTER,supm note 5, a t
14-15.
52.
Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (Supreme Court will
not review issues of state law). See Sandra D. O'Comor, Our Jdicial Federalism,
35 CASEW . RES. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984).
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on federal precedent in reaching its c o n c l ~ s i o n ) . ~ ~
Furthermore, if the state court strikes down a state law or
regulation because it violates a federal provision comparable to
a particular state provision, then the decision is reviewable for
lacking an independent state ground.54 The analysis is
simpler when the state court denies relief and holds that
neither state nor federal law is violated. That judgment is
reviewable because it can never be independent of the federal
ground. Thus, Michigan u. Long acknowledges interpretive
autonomy for state courts in their grants of relief (based on
independent and adequate grounds) but never for their denial
of relief.55
The independent and adequate state grounds emerge from
the language, traditions and different institutional positions of
the federal and state supreme courts.56Differences in text are
perhaps the most fertile source of interpretative autonomy.
State constitutions differ substantially from the federal text
and from each other; many are remarkably detailed and
specih5' In over forty of the state documents, invocations of
a Supreme Being are followed by numerous terms describing
religious liberty and protecting the rights of conscience,
worship, and religious opinion and exercise from interference,
infringement, control, discrimination, preference, persecution or
compulsion.58Twenty constitutions contain provisos like those
53.

See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
When . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable
explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because
it believed that federal law required it do so.

Id.
54.
O'Connor, supra note 52, at 6.
Id.
55.
TARR&PORTER,supra note 5, at 208.
56.
57.
For information regarding the sources of language of state constitutions, see
Leonard W. Levy, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, in RELIGIONAND THE STATE50-52 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985);
McConnell, supra note 37, at 1426-27; 3 ANSONP. STOKES,CHURCHAND STATEIN
THE UNITEDSTATES 443-44 (1950); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 270 (Vt.
1990).
Because of the textual specificity, interpretations in many cases may be easy,
unlike the sparse federal text which often must be filled with content. Tarr, supra
note 6, at 94-95. But compare Gardner's criticism that this reduces the lofty aims
of state constitutions because they behave more like statutes. Gardner, supra note
41, at 800, 819-21.
Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, at 312; FREISEN,supra note 45, 8 4.06.
58.
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already mentioned:'
many also recite religious exemptions
from taxation and military service.60 In addition, the state
texts often recognize rights that have no federal co~nterpart.~'
The history of these specific provisions may inform a state
court of a specific intent of the framers that is particularly
meaningful to the case before it.62
The traditions of the state and its courts may also be
significant to interpretive independence. Pre-existing state
law-common, statutory and constitutional-may take a court
in directions that differ from federal trends. This happened in
First Covenant Church 11, where the Washington Supreme
Court criticized Smith for placing free exercise in a
subordinate, instead of preferred, position and for accepting a
disadvantaged status for minority religions, directly contrary to
state positions on the issue.63States may justify a particular
interpretation that differs from the federal understanding by
reference to historical experiences of the state, specific
socioeconomic or demographic concerns (such as particular
ethnic, racial or religious minorities), matters of particular local
interest, o r the public attitudes of the state's citizen^.'^
Freisen documents the variety of religious liberty provisions found in state
constitutions. Those provisions, followed by the number of state constitutions
containing such provisions, are as follows: Generally securing toleration of religious
sentiment-10; no molestation in persodproperty for religious opinion-11; right to
worship-27; freedom of conscience-38; forbidding discrimination against free
exercise or based on religion--34; free exercise clause like federal-9; no compelled
church attendanc+29; right to refrain from religious services in public schools-5;
exemption from military-23; religious exemption from state taxation-34;
no
establishment clause like
religious test for jury, witness, franchise, etc.-19;
federal-11; no preference clause-32; ban on religiouslsectarian control of publicly
funded schools or religious indoctrination in public schools-19; release time-6; no
compulsory individual money contributions--30; no giftslfundslappropriations t o
religious institutions-34;
exemption for transportation/textbooks/grants-8; no
religious control of public education funding-3. Id. app. 4A at 1-17.
59.
Tarr, supra note 6, at 77.
J. ANTIEAUEl' AL., RELIGION
UNDERTHE STATECONSTITUTIONS
ch.
CHE~TER
60.
6 (1965).
61.
See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. of Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980), discussed infia note 134 and accompanying
text.
62.
See Tarr, supra note 6, at 94, 95.
63.
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1992).
64.
See State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650-51 (N.J. 1983); State v. Hunt, 450
A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986). See generally
Terence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: %apt in the
Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAMLINE
L. REV. 51 (1984); James W. Talbot, Rethinking
Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1099
(1991).
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Particular sensitivities (as well as particular prejudices) are
reflected in these interpretive traditions because, as one judge
writes, "states demystify constitutional law . . . . [State courtsl
say precisely what they mean." State constitutions are more
frequently amended than the Federal Constitution, and the
"democratic process is more likely to be reflected" in them.65
Different institutional positions further justify separate
state constitutional interpretations. The Federal Constitution
must be interpreted on behalf of the nation. Thus, the
institutional position of state courts differs from that of federal
courts because concerns about a national polity are lacking: the
state constitutional decision is not made for the country as a
whole. By contrast, since the Supreme Court does rule for the
nation, it at times decides an issue in a particular way
precisely because it wants to respect or preclude state diversity
on that issue-a role not relevant to state
Many other reasons are commonly proffered for giving
attention to state constitutions. One of the main reasons is the
lack of stability, consistency or coherence in much federal
jurispr~dence.~
The
~ high courts of Minnesota and
Washington, when independently interpreting their state
provisions, both cited the "uncertainty" caused by Smith
because of its departure from a long history of established
law?' The state courts that have departed from Smith are
obviously opposed t o the definition of religious liberty now
employed by the Supreme Court, and are unpersuaded by the
high court's reasoning.6gAnother reason for giving attention
to state constitutions is that often there is inadequate guidance
at the federal level, perhaps because the Supreme Court has
never addressed issues which arise more commonly at the state
level.
The propriety of departing from federal precedent has been
a matter of great debate. Proponents of a "relational"
Yvonne Kauger, Reflections on Federalism: Protections Afforded by State
65.
Constitutions, 27 GONZ.L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1991).
B r e ~ a n ,Guardians of Individual Rights, supra note 44, a t 546; Peter J.
66.
Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts,
33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 733, 744, 764, 791 (1982). Additionally, procedural and
jurisdictional differences may give broader jurisdiction to state courts.
Kauger, supm note 65, at 7.
67.
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Mim. 1990); First Covenant
68.
Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1992).
B r e ~ a n supra
,
note 5, a t 500; Fritz, supm note 40, at 61; Tam, supra note
69.
6, at 106.
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understanding of the state and federal constitutions view state
constitutions only in relation to the federal text and
interpretation. They argue that states, as part of a federal
polity, should give great deference to decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court and depart from federal precedent only for
"cogent and persuasive reason^,"^' only where state and
federal texts differ, or only where a previously established body
of state law leads to a different result.71For this "federal-first"
school of interpretation, the presumption favors a uniform
interpretation of state and federal texts unless a departure is
sufficiently justified. Thus, the state text is understood and
invoked only in relation t o the federal text and merely
supplements the federal ''floor'' of rights.72
A non-relational understanding of state constitutional
interpretation starts from the opposite position that "there is
no basis in constitutional law for presuming that the state
constitution parallels the federal constitution. The state
constitution must be interpreted separately from the federal
constitution unless there are good reasons of policy to establish
a uniform interpretati~n."~~
The major proponent of this state
primacy or "state-first" approach was Justice Hans Linde,
Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 847 (Cal. 1991) (Lucas,
70.
C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992).
Justice Pollack of the New Jersey Supreme Court argues that
71.
in appropriate cases, the individual states may accord greater respect
than the federal government t o certain fundamental rights . . . .

....

Nonetheless, we proceed cautiously before declaring rights under our
state Constitution that differ significantly from those enumerated by the
United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the federal
Constitution. Our caution emanates, in part, from our recognition of the
general advisability in a federal system of uniform interpretation of
identical constitutional provisions.
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931-32 (NJ. 1982) (citations omitted).
72.
See B r e ~ a n ,Guardians of Individual Rights, supra note 44, at 548;
Brennan, supra note 5, at 491, 502-04; Kauger, supra note 65, at 2. These
relational views can be further broken down into the following: Equivalence Model
(presumption that state constitutional rights are equivalent to federal counterparts);
Equivalence Plus Model (the state constitution can recognize greater rights than
under federal counterparts); Equivalence Minus Model (federal standards do not
control what is found under state constitution). The Equivalence Plus Model is the
most popular in the "new judicial federalism." Collins & Galie, supra note 44, a t
323-34.
73.
Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 948 (Pashman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); see also Morongo, 809 P.2d at 836 (Mosk, J., concurring);
Stanley H. Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1081 (1985).
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former Oregon Supreme Court Justice, who argued that the
state constitution should be interpreted without any reference
to the federal law; in fact, in his view, it should be analyzed
first.74If the issue can be disposed of on state constitutional
grounds, then the court need not reach the federal issue under
the comparable federal provision. If, however, the outcome
would differ under the federal analysis, the court would then
engage in a federal interpretation. Because of Justice Linde's
presence on the state's high court, Oregon uses this nonrelational approach.75 Indeed, it employed just such an
approach in the court's 1986 decision in Smith u. Employment
D i v i ~ i o nthe
, ~ ~same case that eventually made its way t o the
U.S. Supreme Court and revolutionized federal free exercise
doctrine. The Oregon court held that, under the state's
constitution, Smith could be denied unemployment
compensation because a generally applicable, facially neutral
law like the unemployment benefits statute could not violate
the religious exercise provisions of the state constitution even if
an inadvertent burden on religious exercise resulted. Under the
Federal Constitution, however, the Oregon Supreme Court
applied the Sherbert analysis, which, the court concluded,
compelled a different result.
From the Oregon experience it is clear that a commitment
to develop an independent body of state constitutional law will
not necessarily expand upon the rights given by corresponding
Nevertheless, it appears to be the
federal pro~isions.~~
See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Hans A. Linde,
74.
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT.L. REV. 379
(1980). Non-relational, independent forms of state constitutional analysis can be
broken down as follows: the Nonequivalent Text Model (the state constitution is
interpreted differently because the text, history, and purpose of the provision
differs from the federal counterpart), and the Nonequivalent Model (the "state first"
analysis that is concerned with the "analytical soundness" of the state
constitutional interpretation). Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 328-36.
Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 333-36; TARR& PORTER, supra note 5, a t
75.
30. The "state first" or primacy theory of state constitutional interpretation has
also been employed in Washington, Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont. Collins
& Galie, supra note 44, at 333.
Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660
76.
(1988); Black v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986), vacated sub nom.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
77.
Neither the federal-first nor the state-fnst approach necessarily yields
expanded constitutional rights. A relational theory like Justice B r e ~ a n ' sjustifies
resort to state constitutions only for the purpose of more expansive interpretations,
but the circumstances that justify such use may be quite limited. See supra note
70-72 and accompanying text. Similarly, under a state-first approach, rights might
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considered judgment of most commentators on the new judicial
federalism that the state-first approach holds the best hope for
integrity of interpretation "in the light of text and tradition,"
wholly independent of the federal analysis.7s Independent
state interpretation has the tremendous benefit of "analytical
so~ndness."~~
The state's high court can build a separate body
of consistent constitutional law, thereby avoiding the frequent
fluctuations of federal law." "[Tlhe logic of principled
be curtailed instead of expanded, as is evidenced by the Oregon Supreme Court's
earliest Smith decision. Tarr has noted that Oregon has "made important efforts to
resuscitate free exercise provisions of its Constitution." But that "resuscitation"
refers to the state's independence in interpreting its own fundamental law; it
certainly does not refer to expansion of rights. Tarr, supra note 6, at 77. Thus, the
relational approach might be more sensitive to problems with the federal doctrine,
and might produce state decisional law expanding upon federal rights, but it might
do so in only a very narrow category of cases. The state primacy approach might
be more conducive to developing a coherent religion doctrine that treats free
exercise and establishment provisions comprehensively, but would not necessarily
enhance the protection of religious liberty. See infra notes 207-218 and
accompanying text.
Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7, at 549. See generally Collins & Galie,
78.
supra note 44; TARR & PORTER, supra note 5; Emily F. Hartigan, Law and
Mystery: Calling the Letter to Life Through the Spirit of the Law of State
Constitutions, 6 J.L. & REL. 225 (1988). But see Gardner, supra note 41, at 812-30.
79.
Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 333. Perhaps the coherence and
"analytical soundness* of the state-first model responds adequately to the concerns
of the late Professor Paul Bator, who said, Y must confess to some misgivings
about the extent to which some of this commentary [on the new judicial
federalism] seems to assume that state constitutional law is simply 'available' to be
manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed unsatisfactory."
Williams, supra note 48, at 189.
Commentators continue to argue in favor of the state-first model in the
80.
area of religious exercise and church-state relations. See FREISEN,supra note 45;
Fritz, supra note 40; Tam, supra note 6. Professor J e ~ i f e Freisen,
r
in her recent
treatise on state constitutional law, laments the dilemmas handed to states when
they base their interpretation of their own constitutions on federal decisional law.
While she concentrates on the establishment provisions, and in particular the state
application of the federal test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), her
comments apply to the free exercise area as well. State courts slide all over the
doctrinal landscape because they attempt to track Supreme Court decisions.
According to Freisen,
When a state court simply incorporates the prevailing federal standard
into a state interpretation, notwithstanding the difference in text, the
clarity and stability of the results is in some doubt. Given the extreme
flexibility of many federal standards, it is not surprising that state courts
that opt for this approach often render opinions inconsistent with later
rulings of the Supreme Court and even inconsistent with the state's own
earlier opinions.
FREISEN,supra note 45, $ 4.04. State application of the federal establishment test
has been particularly problematic, and now appears t o be problematic with the
shift from Sherbert to Smith at the federal level. See infra notes 153-156 and
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interpretation at the state level . . . demands that any given
argument be tested on its own merits independently of what
level of constitutional protection could result."81 If the result
conflicts with federal law, then the litigants could not win
under the state constitution." Even if the state interpretation
is not controlling because the Supremacy Clause requires
application of federal precedent, the state's analysis may apply
in future cases if federal jurisprudence changes or if the facts of
the next case render federal precedent inappli~able.~~
Under both the federal-first and state-first approaches,
state courts can establish "independent and adequate grounds"
for violations of state constitutional guarantees, which would
preclude U.S. Supreme Court review under Michigan u. Long.
Under the federal-first analysis, the independent and adequate
grounds requirement would be met when, for instance, the
state court finds sufficient justification in its state
constitutional text and case history for departing from the
federal a n a l y ~ i s . Under
~
the state-first analysis, the
requirement would be met when the state constitution is
analyzed without resort t o federal law.85

Recent reliance on state constitutions may signal that state
courts are moving t o reclaim an interpretive role in free
exercise cases. With varying degrees, colonial charters and
later state constitutions acknowledged the religious rights of
citizens in the pre- and post-revolutionary eras.86 When

accompanying text. Once states commit themselves to following federal decisional
law, the temptation to follow the federal courts in lockstep (including its
unpredictable fluctuations) is overwhelming. Fritz, supra note 40, at 69, 72.
Tam, supra note 6, at 79 11.28 (quoting Ronald Collins, Reliance on State
81.
Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGSCONST.L.Q. 1, 15
(1981)).
Id. at 79-80.
82.
83.
Id. at 78-79.
84.
See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
But see Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992) (case is subject to
review on the federal determination because court held that neither constitution
was violated and a denial of relief is never independent).
85.
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); Cooper v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d
571 (Mass. 1990).
McConnell, supra note 37, at 1425-30, 1455-66.
86.
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drafted, the First Amendment restricted only federal action.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this in 1845, when it explicitly
stated that the religious liberty of citizens was to be protected
by the laws and constitutions of the state^.^' During the next
century, state courts created a considerable body of state
constitutional law governing such issues as restrictions on
religion, Bible reading in public schools, the use of public
property for religious purposes, and aid to religious schools.88
States continued their state constitutional analyses even after
1940, when the U.S. Supreme Court (as part of its broader
activity of selective incorporation) applied the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment to the states through the
Fourteenth A~nendrnent.~~
Until the 1960s, state courts were consistently unwilling to
recognize religious exercise claims made under the state
constitution^.^^ Under what Professor Alan Tam calls the
"secular regulation rule," the vast majority of cases upheld the
police power of the states to "limit personal liberties in the
interest of the public
Repeated requests for religious
exemptions from general laws were denied based on the state's
legitimate role in preventing injury to public health, public
morality, public safety and the good order of society.g2
I n the mid-twentieth century many assumed the secular

87.
The Court refused to accept jurisdiction over a Louisiana criminal
prosecution of a Catholic priest convicted of violating a local ordinance which
prohibited corpses to be displayed in churches during funeral services. Permoli v.
Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. 589 (1845), relying in part on Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (first eight amendments of U.S. Constitution
not applicable to the states).
88.
See ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60; FREISEN,supm note 45, $ 4.01; Fritz,
supra note 40, a t 61; Tam, supra note 6, a t 89-101.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
89.
90.
Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment
Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620, 627 (1951); see also ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note
60, a t ch. 6; Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning
Point?, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 217; G. Alan Tam, State Constitutionalism and "First
Amendment' Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTIONSIN
CON~IONA
POLICYMAKING
L
21, 23-24 (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988).
ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, at 65.
91.
Id. at 68-95. Laws challenged involved vaccinations against communicable
92.
disease, unauthorized practice of medicine, fluoridation of water supply,
contraception, transfusions and medical care, Sunday closing, polygamy, blasphemy,
prohibition on alcoholic beverages, use of dangerous instrumentalities in religious
ceremonies, fortune telling and spiritualism, distribution of religious literature and
solicitation, and zoning.
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regulation rule was consistent with religious freedom.93 It is
easy to understand why. During that period there was
widespread accommodation of Christianity, the religion of the
majority. Accordingly, voluntary Bible reading and prayer i n
the public schools were upheld," as were anti-blasphemy laws
and Sunday closing laws.95 Moreover, legislative religious
exemptions, while not common, existed.96 For instance, state
constitutions often provided for property tax exemptions for
churches and military exemptions for conscientious objectors.
No state religion was officially established, no taxes supported
any worship, and no state interfered with conscience in matters
of religious belief.g7 Perhaps most importantly, the secular
laws themselves were considered to protect a religio-moral
order. "The courts always protect the state against immoral
practices that are clearly at variance with the established
standards of Christian civilization.'@' If the state courts

supra note 57, at 446-47.
See, e.g., STOKES,
93.
See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 75 A.2d 880 (N.J. 1950), appeal
94.
dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). In Doremus, the New Jersey Supreme Court
discussed a state statute requiring "at least five verses from the [Old Testament
to] be read, without comment, in each public school classroom," N.J. STAT.ANN.
$ 18:14-77, while mandating "[nlo religious service or exercise . . . shall be held in
any school receiving [public money]," N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 18:14-78, "except the
reading of the Bible and repeating of the Lord's Prayer." The court held that the
statutes did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution regarding the prohibition against the establishment of religion because
the statutes
do not go to the establishment of religion or against the free exercise
thereof . . . . [I]t is clear . . . that the sense of the [First] [Almendment
does not serve to prohibit government from recognizing the existence and
sovereignty of God . . . . The fact is that the First Amendment does not
say, and so far as we are able to determine was not intended to say,
that God shall not be acknowledged by our government as God . . . . We
consider that the Old Testament and the Lord's Prayer, pronounced
without comment, are not sectarian, and that the short exercise provided
by the statute does not constitute sectarian instruction or sectarian
worship but is a simple recognition of the Supreme Ruler of the
Universe . . . .
Doremus, 75 A.2d at 889.
ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, at 80.
95.
Id. at 69-70 (Christian Science healers exempt from medical licensing
96.
requirements); id. at 83 (sacramental use of wine exempt from alcohol prohibition
laws).
97.
STOKES,supm note 57, at 447.
98.
Id. Stokes lists three "tests to which religious freedom may be put: does its
manifestation interfere with freedom of others; does it result in actdpradices
detrimental to social welfare or safety of the state; does it run counter to the
moral law?" Id. at 695.
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thought state laws upheld a religio-moral order, exemptions
from those laws to permit religious exercise must have seemed
an outrageous notion.gg Furthermore, the argument that
limited government could burden free exercise was difficult for
courts to comprehend because pre-1940 America was
unfamiliar with the expansive bureaucratic apparatus of
today's government.
The earliest signs of erosion of the secular regulation rule
came in the areas of hand bill distribution and the licensing of
literature. State courts in the 1920s and -1930s repeatedly
upheld restrictions on the distribution of religious literature,
primarily affecting Jehovah's Witnesses. By the late 1930s, the
U.S. Supreme Court had begun to strike down these laws
under a more expansive free speech jurisprudence, and then
later, in 1940, under free exercise doctrine.loO After
incorporation, and with the realization that the Supreme
Court's interest in the Jehovah's Witnesses meant a federal
override of state laws, some state courts began to hold
restrictions on literature distribution unconstitutional under
their own constitutions (on the grounds that they infringed
religious freedom or lacked fair and adequate standards).lO'
Despite the Supreme Court's attention t o rights of religious
expression, prior to 1963 state courts continued to interpret
their constitutions to require only that limits on religion be
minimally rational, meet due process requirements, and not
contain unnecessary, unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory
standards.lo2 But then came Sherbert v. Verner.lo3 Sherbert

99.
See, e.g., Dziatkiewicz v. Township of Maplewood, 178 A. 205 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1935) (upholding township ordinance prohibiting canvassing and distribution of
literature without permit as a reasonable exercise of police power). The supreme
court of New Jersey scolded the Jehovah's Witness claimants for not being law
abiding:
I t would seem to this court that men and women engaged in the loRy
and idealistic work, as the prosecutors claim to have been engaged
herein, i.e., of spreading their religious conceptions to the public at large,
ought to be among the very first to submit to and comply with all
reasonable regulations which, obviously, were enacted in the interest of
the public health and safety and which regulations were designed for the
good of the greatest number.
Id. a t 208.
100.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 US. 147 (1939) (free speech); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 US.
444 (1938) (free speech).
101. ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, a t 88-89.
102. Id. at 87, 98-99. Writing in 1951, one commentator lamented,
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revolutionized the federal interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment by requiring a strict scrutiny
standard of review for general laws that burden religious
exercise.lo4 Because of incorporation, it also revolutionized
the way states interpreted parallel constitutional provisions.
Sherbert's impact on the states' treatment of religious
exercise under their own constitutions is best illustrated by the
Minnesota case of I n re Jenison.lo5 Minnesota citizen Laverna
Jenison refused to serve as a juror because of the biblical
command that we not judge one another. She was sentenced to
30 days in jail for contempt of court, having failed to comply
with her civic duties. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in
upholding her conviction and sentence, found that Article 1,
Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution and the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution did not require an
exemption from a law expressing a generally applicable legal
obligation.lo6 A legislative exemption for religiously inspired
conscientious objection would have been upheld, but a judicial
exemption would not be mandated. Three months later, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Sherbert. On a writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court subsequently remanded Jenison to
Minnesota's high court, with instructions to reconsider in light
Although state constitutions contain full statements of our civil liberties,
on the whole the record of state court guardianship of "First Amendment
Freedoms" is disappointing. Only occasionally do state cases . . . take a
position protecting the freedoms beyond what has been required by the
United States Supreme Court . . . . Time and time again, the United
States Supreme Court has found it necessary to reverse many state
courts which were oversolicitous of local attempts to silence unpopular
ideas on the ground of traffic control, the administration of public parks
or the possibility of violence.
Paulsen, supra note 90, at 642. This lack of initiative was not surprising; except
for the freedom of expression cases, even federal precedent was itself steeped in
the minimum rationality tradition. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J.)
(blood transfusion ordered for child of Jehovah's Witness parents does not violate
state or federal constitution), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). Neither Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (holding prohibition of polygamous practices of
Mormons constitutional) nor Prince v. Massachusetts, 32 1 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding
prohibition on literature distribution by Jehovah's Witness child under child labor
laws constitutional), both discussed in ~erricone,suggests a strid scrutiny standard
of review for government
restrictions on religious conduct. Thus, states did not
have much internal or external impetus to depart from the secular regulation rule.
103.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
104. See id. at 406-10.
105. I n re Jenison, 120 N.W.2d 515 (Mind, vacated, 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
106. Note that aRer incorporation, states made determinations under both
constitutions if the federal claim was pleaded.
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of Sherbert.''? The Minnesota Supreme Court, pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause, applied the new strict scrutiny
standard of review and mandated an exemption from jury duty.
The court found that "there has been an inadequate showing
that the state's interest in obtaining competent jurors requires
us to override [Laverna Jenison'sl right t o the free exercise of
her religi~n."''~
A subtle shift of emphasis in the state courts from state to
federal constitutional law is observable after Sherbert. To use
Minnesota as an example, in the pre-Sherbert decisions, the
Minnesota Supreme Court based its decisions on both the state
and federal constitutions. After Sherbert, however, there was
no longer any mention of the state constitution; it had, in
effect, vanished fkom the opinions' texts and presumably from
the court's consideration. If incorporation made it necessary t o
look a t both the state and federal constitutional law, Sherbert
seemed to require reference only to the federal text. The sheer
power of the federal requirement of a drastically higher
standard of judicial review-requiring not mere rationality but
strict scrutiny-pushed
state constitutional texts to the
margins. log
Hence, during the Sherbert years (1963-1990),state courts
followed federal doctrine and precedent to the virtual exclusion
of their own fundamental law. This is certainly
understandable. Sherbert required strict scrutiny of laws
burdening religion. Consequently, states were required to
abandon their well-developed secular regulation rule. Even if a
state had attempted independently to ensure generous
protection of religious exercise under its own constitution, the
controlling federal precedent would make such an attempt
largely redundant."'
Therefore, a separate s t a t e
constitutional jurisprudence i n free exercise was
107. In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
108. In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963). Note that the instruction to remand
for reconsideration was really a requirement to apply the compelling interest
standard. Minnesota was not free to apply a lower standard of judicial review
because its own constitution had been interpreted in that way; federalism permits
state constitutions to provide greater protection, but not less.
109. "Incorporation has had an enormous impact on the constitutional law
applied by state courts. AfZer incorporation, there are no entirely independent
models of state judicial review." Federal decisions became paramount, and federal
decisional law continues to influence much of the thinking of those working with
parallel state constitutional guarantees. Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 322.
110. See infia notes 118-143 and accompanying text.

2751

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

299

unnecessary. 11'
As a result, during the Sherbert years most states "rel[ied]
on federal law on free exercise issues, even in areas where [the]
Supreme Court [had] not ruled."l12 The vast majority did not
engage in any separate state analysis because they either
completely ignored their state constitution^,^^^ or considered
state provisions coextensive with the federal counterpart.ll4
In this second group of cases it is difficult to determine
whether there was any independent state basis for the
judgment^."^ Although this lack of independent state
jurisprudence is understandable, it was still problematic. One
effect of reliance on federal doctrine for all or most of the cases
involving religion was to prevent any serious development of a
comprehensive state constitutional law of religious liberty
grounded in the state's text and tradition. Additionally, by
choosing to use state provisions in a piecemeal fashion, if at all,
state courts did not have to grapple with significant issues
touching on the relationship between the establishment and
free exercise concepts in their own state law? And finally,
federal courts a n d interpretations contributed disproportionately to the development of state law."?
Despite the fact that controlling federal precedent rendered
independent state analysis largely extraneous, a small group of
states did explicitly interpret their religious liberty provisions
~
prior to 1990.118 Maine,"' M i ~ s i s s i p p i , ' ~Tennessee,l2l
111. Only in the Establishment Clause area has there been noticeable reliance
on state constitutions, but even there federal doctrine and precedent remains
predominant. See Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of
Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625
(1985).
112. TARR& PORTER,supra note 5, a t 21; see also State v. DeLaBruere, 577
A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990); Miller & Sheers, supra note 36. This has occurred largely
because of the assumption that state constitutional guarantees "were mere
analogues of the federal guarantees and therefore afforded no independent
protection." TARR& PORTER,supra note 5, a t 21.
State court discussions of constitutional rights usually referred to those of
federal constitutional law. See Gardner, supra note 41.
113. Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, a t 307.
114. Id. a t 310-11. Gardner calls this the "lockstep analysis." Gardner, supra
note 41, a t 788.
115. This common problem of obscurity-states failing to specify upon which
constitution a holding is grounded-is discussed at length in Gardner, supra note
41, a t 784-86.
Tarr, supra note 6, a t 77-78.
116.
117. Id. at 76-80.
118. Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, a t 308-10.
119. Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural Sews., 551 A.2d 1377 (Me.
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and Kentucky1= required the same strict scrutiny standard of
review under their own constitutions as that required under
the Federal Constitution. And, as indicated above, Oregon
determined that its own fundamental law provided a lower
standard of protection to religious exercise, rejecting the
compelling state interest test when generally applicable,
facially neutral laws were challenged?
The texts of the religious exercise provisions vary among
these states, and all differ from the federal language. Maine
and Mississippi are among the twenty states that contain
provisos qualifying their religious exercise statement?
Tennessee's language differs significantly from the text of the
Federal Free Exercise Clause, but does not contain a
proviso.125 Kentucky's provision offers specific protection
unavailable under the federal text.lZ6 Oregon's language,
1988).
120. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985).
121. State 'e=c rel. Swam v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tern. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 954 (1976).
122. Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589
S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 US. 938 (1980).
123. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660
(1988); Black v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986), vacated sub nom.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988); Salem College & Academy, Inc. v.
Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985).
124. The Mississippi Constitution reads as follows: "the free enjoyment of all
religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held sacred. The
rights hereby secured shall not be construed to justify acts . . . dangerous to the
CONST.art. 111, 18. For the Maine
peace and safety of the state . . . ." MISS.
Constitutional provision, see supra note 25.
125. The Tennessee Constitution reads:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no man can of
right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any minister against his consent; that no human authority can,
in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience;
and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious
establishment or mode of worship.
TENN. CONST.art. I, $ 3.
126. The Kentucky Constitution states:
No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or
denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to attend any
place of worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such
place, or to the salary or support of any minister of religion; nor shall
any man be compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be
conscientwusly opposed; and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no
person shall be taken away, or in any wise diminished or enlarged, on
account of his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or teaching.
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which is very detailed, differs from the federal text and
contains no proviso.127Mississippi and Kentucky have relied
entirely on their own constitutions and employed a strict
scrutiny standard of review to protect the exercise of religion.
Tennessee and Maine have engaged in analyses of both state
and federal constitutions and have found the strict scrutiny
standard of Sherbert required by each document.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in Blount v.
Department of Education & Cultural S e r ~ i c e s , 'interpreted
~~
its proviso to be consistent with the compelling state
interesaeast restrictive alternative analysis of the strict
scrutiny standard of review.12g The Mississippi Supreme
Court grounded its decision in i n re Brown13o solely on its
state constitution but did not focus on the proviso language.
No human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with
the rights of conscience.
KY. CONST.5 5 (emphasis added).
127. The Oregon Constitution provides: "All men shall be secure in the Natural
right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of
religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience." OR. CONST. art. I,
90 2, 3.
551 A.2d 1377, 1385 We. 1988).
128.
129. The court held that neither the federal nor state constitution protected
home-schooler parents from the state's authority to approve their children's
educational program. The court first engaged in a federal analysis, using the
burdenlcompelling interesfleast restrictive alternative test to determine that the
burden on the Blounts' free exercise was justified by state interests. It then
entered into analysis of the state constitutional claim.
The Blounts argued that the provisos in the state text concerning disturbance
of the public peace and obstruction of religious worship should be read to provide
even greater protection than the compelling interest standard. They argued that
the state language so limited the range of governmental interests capable of
overbalancing religious practice that less protection for the countervailing public
interests should be afforded when those interests, though compelling, do not
prevent disturbance of the peace or obstruction of the worship of others. The court
refused to read the provisos to give greater protection for religious conduct than
the federal counterpart, but it made clear that the state and federal constitutions
each independently required a compelling interest4east restrictive alternative test.
The court concluded
that the full range of protection afforded the Blounts by the Maine
Constitution is also available under the United States Constitution . . . .
Maine's qualifying phrase "provided that that person does not disturb the
public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship" cannot be
read as giving less weight to "compelling public interests" than does the
unqualified language of the First Amendment forbidding any "law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

Id.
130.

478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985).
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Nevertheless, it severely limited the governmental interests
that could override religious claims, announcing a strict
scrutiny standard of review.l3l Tennessee's Constitution has
neither an obstruction of worship nor a disturbance of peace
and safety proviso, but the Tennessee Supreme Court in State
ex rel. Swann v. Packls2 explicitly recognized that "Article 1,
Section 3 of the Constitution of Tennessee contains a
substantially stronger guaranty of religious freedoms" than the
First Amendment contains.133
131.
The court held that the state free exercise provision protected the plaintiff,
a Jehovah's Witness, from being required to accept a blood transfusion. A blood
transfusion was ordered for Mattie Brown, the victim of and witness to a violent
crime, because the state wanted to ensure she lived to testify. The court held that
the blood transfusion should not have occurred without her consent. The state's
interest in her testimony did not address any "great and imminent public danger";
only "compelling considerations of public safety and dangern can interfere with her
free exercise rights. Id. at 1039.
The court's analysis suggests that the state interpretation of what types of
interests constitute a compelling interest is more limited than the federal
interpretation, bordering on a clear and present danger test. Although it wrote, "we
believe [the decision] compelled by a faithfbl application of First Amendment
jurisprudence," id. at 1039 n.5, the court's decision is grounded solely on its own
constitution, avoids the federal language of burden and compelling interest, refers
to federal cases only as examples, and draws distinctions that are not present in
the federal jurisprudence. "Religiously grounded actions or conduct are often beyond
the authority of the state to control. Where the religiously grounded 'action' is a
refusal to act rather than affirmative, overt conduct, the State's authority to
interfere is virtually non-existent except only in the instance of the grave and
immediate public danger." Id. at 1037 (citations omitted).
The court made it clear that the plaintiffs rights would yield only to
"conflicting rights vested in others" that are expressed in the law, not "mere
interests." Id. at 1036. Its constitution therefore "prohibits state interference with
most instances of the free exercise of religion." Id. at 1039.
132.
527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
133. Id. at 107. In banning snake handling done in religious services as a public
nuisance, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that under both federal and state
constitutions a religious practice may be limited, curtailed or restrained to the
point of outright prohibition, where it involves a clear and present danger to the
interests of society. "Elhe scales are always weighted in favor of free exercise and
the state's interest must be compelling; it must be substantial; the danger must be
clear and present and so grave as to endanger paramount public interests." Id. at
111. The Court relied on the belieflact distinction and then discussed Cantwell's
clear and present danger doctrine. Id. at 108 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)). The court also recognized that the new balancing test of
Sherbert was consistent with its prior law. Id. at 109 (discussing Harden v. State,
216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948)), which upheld the constitutionality of the Tennessee
Snake Handler's Act in the face of a grave and immediate danger). According to
the Tennessee high court, Sherbert did not change Harden; it was based on the
clear and present danger and substantial interest doctrine of Cantwell. Thus, for
Tennessee, like Mississippi, the standard of review required under the state
constitution is arguably higher than that of Sherbert. However, the court, while
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In Kentucky State Board for Elementary & Secondary
Education v. Rudasill, Kentucky's Supreme Court provided an
independent state constitutional analysis in its interpretation
of a religious education provision that has no parallel federal
- text? In so doing, the court adopted a least restrictive
alternative test t o give broad operational latitude to churchaffiliated schools.
Oregon's consistent use of the state-first approach in state
constitutional adjudication was applied to free exercise in 1985.
In that year, Chief Justice Linde wrote the decision in Salem
that
~
College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment ~ i v i s i o n ' ~
applied a minimum rationality test to a generally applicable
unemployment tax challenged by a religious school.136 The
court held that the state had not infringed the school's right t o
religious freedom when all similarly situated employers in the
state were subject to the same tax.ls7 When an obligation is
recognizing the constitutions as two independent sources, explicitly finds the state
and federal standards consistent. The T e ~ e s s e eCourt made specific note of its
textual detail and strength of its religious protections as compared to the federal
language. In an earlier decision, the high court found the state and federal
provisions relating to religion "practically synonymous. If anything, our own organic
law is broader and more comprehensive in its guarantee of worship and freedom of
conscience, in that 'no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious
establishment or mode of worship.' " Carden v. Bland, 288 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tern.
1956) (quoting TENN.CONST.art. I, 8 3).
134. 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1980). Section 5 of
the Kentucky Bill of Rights protects parents' interests in directing the religious
upbringing of children (and conscientious objection to public schools). The court
wrote,
[Ilt is obvious that Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution is more
restrictive of the power of the state to regulate private and parochial
schools than is the first amendment to the federal constitution as it has
been applied to the states. Consequently, the Supremacy Clause . . . does
not require us to ride with the Federales in order to reach a decision.
Id. at 879 n.3 (citations omitted).
After discussing the legislative history, the court found that the state has an
interest in controlling religious schools to the extent that all schools must prepare
children for citizenship in a democracy. Religious schools can do this while using
textbooks and teachers of their choice, and standardized testing can be used to be
sure they are accomplishing their educational goals. This is essentially a least
restrictive alternative test. Thus, Kentucky must approve a religious school unless
the state demonstrates the institution is not a 'school" (i.e., i t fails to educate
fiiture citizens as indicated by the standardized testing).
135. 695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985).
136. The court could use its own state constitutional analysis because the
Supremacy Clause is not applicable where the state runs a federal program that
Congress has not made obligatory. The court was thus able to develop and apply a
lower standard of protedion to religion. Id. at 34.
137. Central to the court's reasoning was the notion that the tax was tailored to
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generally applicable, the court indicated, there is no need to
engage in any balancing to determine whether the state has a
compelling interest. Rather, the legislature is free to exempt
religious schools from the generally applicable statute requiring
the unemployment tax payment, as long as all similarly
situated religious schools are treated the same. But the court,
it concluded, will not mandate such an exemption.ls8
A year later, in the Oregon Supreme Court's first decision
~ ~ Black u. Employment
in Smith v. Employment D i ~ i s i o n 'and
Division1" (companion cases), the court expanded Salem
College's holding on taxation to include general and neutral
regulations. Since a generally applicable, facially neutral tax
law had already been held constitutional as applied t o religious
organization^,^^' the Oregon court went further and ruled
that the denial of unemployment benefits through the
operation of a generally applicable statute that is neutral both
on its face and as applied did not violate the Oregon religious
freedom provision. 14'

the non-religious, economic aspects of the school's activities, and therefore the
school was unaffected in its religious aspects. The taxes are not flat taxes on
religious activities; they affect the economic and social aspect of the schools, not
any activities peculiarly characteristic of schools or religious programs; the burdens
are simply financial and clerical. Id. at 34-35. Thus, compliance with general
financial obligations was no different from a required compliance with a host of
other secular health, safety and licensing regulations.
138. Id. at 40-41.
139. 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). Plaintiff Smith,
discharged for misconduct from his job with a private drug-counseling organization
because he had ingested peyote in a religious ceremony of the Native American
Church, argued that the resulting denial of unemployment benefits burdened his
free exercise of religion. The state rule requires denial of unemployment benefits
whenever the job is terminated for misconduct as defined by the employer.
140. 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986), vacated sub mm. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485
U.S. 660 (1988).
141. Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25, 34, 39
(Or. 1985).
142. The court held that the unemployment compensation statute and state rule
regarding termination for misconduct are "completely neutral toward religious
motivations for misconduct. If the statute or rule did discriminate for or against
claimants for worshipping as they chose, we would be faced with an entirely
different issue." Smith, 721 P.2d at 448. The parallel between the two cases of
Salem College and Smith to the two cases of Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization, 493 U.S.378 (1990) and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) is uncanny. But it does not seem that a law targeting religion is
automatically subject to strict scrutiny. In Cooper v. Eugene School District, 723
P.2d 298 (Or. 1986), where a religious garb law targeted religion, the court held
that a teacher could be denied the right to dress in the distinctive attire of the
Sikh religion because that was necessary to maintain religious neutrality in public
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However, the Oregon Supreme Court provided no textual
analysis in either Salem College or Smith t o justify its
departure from the Sherbert standard. Oregon's constitutional
language, on its face, is even stronger than the Tennessee
Constitution's text, in that it protects religious exercise and
enjoyment of religious opinion in addition t o conscience and
worship. And yet Tennessee found that its constitutional
provisions were "substantially stronger" than the federal
language and required strict scrutiny.'" Obviously, text alone
will not be dispositive.
The Oregon decision in Smith reintroduced the secular
regulation rule into the national dialogue. Ultimately, the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted it and thereby restored an earlier
understanding of religious liberty, the very same
understanding it had required states to abandon decades ago.
As a result, the scope and nature of religious liberty are once
again contingent upon the states. And it is to them that the
nation must look for definitions of religious liberty.

What makes it possible today for state supreme courts t o
interpret their constitutions t o require a strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review when fifiy years ago the same
constitutions were interpreted to uphold virtually every
governmental action affecting religious practice? If the texts of
these documents so obviously embody protection for religious
exercise, why didn't courts see the obvious fifty, or even thirty,
years ago? Perhaps the "obvious" was a nation intolerant of
religious pluralism and confident that legislation reflected its
unassailable viewpoint. In that context, the secular regulation
rule served as a framework for persecution; now, after Smith, it
threatens to become a framework for extreme marginalization
of religious conduct, and for a severe form of statist uniformity.
The secular regulation rule failed before; it is now all the more
incompatible with increases in religious pluralism and in
government regulation. When states begin to look at their texts
through the informed lens of recent history, they should see
schools; the teacher's expression was found incompatible with performance of the
official role. Oregon has not employed the balancing test, but it has independently
used an "incompatibility with teaching" test. Id. at 311.
143. See supra note 132-133 and accompanying text.
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something different from what they saw fifty years ago.
The central example of this "new reading" in the postSmith era is the understanding of the provisos as the
enumeration of state interests capable of overbalancing free
exercise. Before and during the Sherbert years, the provisos
failed to impress most state courts as a source of protection for
religious liberty. State courts apparently understood them t o
express the state's power to restrict religion and thus to justify
the secular regulation rule.'" Commentators in the 1960s
considered the proviso language "probably no more than
precatory in nature. Many of the states have not thought it
necessary to include it in their constitutions. Yet the great
majority in one fashion or another have made positive efforts t o
restrict certain religious practice^."'^^ After Sherbert, states
with provisos in their constitutions did not consider them t o be
consistent with the new, higher standard. Writing during the
Sherbert years, Professor Tam stated that the language of these
provisos "seems to afford less protection for religiously
motivated conduct than is now available under the federal
con~titution."~~~
In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the
failure to develop state constitutional law and the heavy
reliance on federal doctrine under the Sherbert rule "may
reflect the judgment that, given the police power exception
found in many state constitutions and precedent, state
constitutions offer less protection of religiously-motivated
conduct than the first a~nendment."'~'
Professor Michael McConnell has reasoned instead that
these provisos recognize the acceptability of religious
exemptions from general laws by specifying those classes of
laws from which exemptions are not available. If the language
meant that any law could override the free exercise of religion,
a proviso would completely swallow up the statement of
protected rights.14' The only plausible interpretation, then, is
144.
Tarr writes, "Relying on such constitutional language, state courts have
generally sustained state laws challenged as violative of religious liberty." Tam,
supra note 90, at 23.
145. ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, at 67.
Tam, supra note 90, at 23.
146.
147. Id. at 24.
148. McConnell, supra note 37, at 1455-66. McConnell also detects in these
provisos historical justification for religious exemptions, finding evidence that
exemptions from generally applicable laws were a natural part of the scheme from
the time of the original drafting of state constitutions. Id. at 1461-66.
The inclusion of a balance on the face of the constitutional provision is not
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that free exercise can be infringed only by specific categories of
governmental interests. Laws that address unenumerated
categories cannot likewise infringe upon religious exercise;
religious exemptions are necessarily required from such laws.
State courts departing from Smith have arrived a t the same
conclusion, thereby giving special weight to the proviso
language.
Since the current federal constitutional interpretation of
free exercise is unreceptive to religious exemptions, state
constitutional claims and arguments will inevitably become
more common.149 Thus, each state ultimately will have to
make the substantive determination under its own constitution
whether to follow the new, drastically lower standard of Smith,
or to continue to follow the higher Sherbert standard. Of
particular concern is a group of thirty-five states that
considered state and federal religious protections to be
coextensive during the Sherbert years, employing the Sherbert
analysis "to such an extent that it is unclear whether their
state constitutions would independently support a compelling
governmental interest test. These states may or may not switch
their level of scrutiny to coincide with the federal judiciary's
new approach."'" The four states that required a high level
of review under their own constitutions prior to Smith will
likely continue to employ strict scrutiny post-Smith. Maine's
high court has already done so,l5' and Tennessee, Kentucky
and Mississippi will likely f01low.l~~

A. States Following Smith's Minimal Scrutiny
Two state supreme courts have explicitly decided t o follow

limited to these types of provisos. Over forty states guarantee protection to speech
on any subject, but then declare that a person may be held responsible for the
abuse of that right. COLLINS,supra note 36, a t 2502.
149. Laycock, Summary, supra note 15, a t 854. For discussion of a parallel shift
to state litigation in the Establishment Clause context, see G. Alan Tarr, Religion
Under State Constitutions, 496 ~ W A L SAM. ACAD.POL. & SOC. SCI. March 1988,
65, 74-75.
150. Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, a t 310-11.
151. Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
152. If we assume that those preSmith states that protected religion under
their own constitutions will continue to do so, and combine them with the postSmith states that have refused to follow Smith, we arrive a t a total of seven:
Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Maine, and
Washington. Against those seven we have three states following Smith's minimum
rationality standard of review: Oregon, Vermont and Iowa.
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the federal lead in Smith: Oregon and Vermont.ls3 When, in
1990, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded Employment Division
u. Smith to the Oregon Supreme Court for implementation of
the final decision, the Oregon Supreme Court welcomed the
federal adoption of the lower standard of review and therefore
maintained the state constitutional position announced four
years earlier when it had first considered Smith.'"
Similarly, Vermont also decided explicitly not to interpret
its own constitution in a way that expands the scope of free
exercise 15ghts.l~~
In State u. DeLaBruere,'" Vermont's Supreme Court chose to follow federal constitutional analysis as
set forth in Smith. The case involved parents who were homeschooling their children and who refused to comply with certain
state regulations. Under Smith, these facts fall within the socalled "hybrid" category which involves a constitutional right in
addition to the free exercise of religion-here, the rights of
parents to control the religious upbringing of their children.
Hybrid cases continue to enjoy strict scrutiny review by the
courts, and so-the Vermont Supreme Court required the state
to show a compelling governmental interest implemented
through the least restrictive alternative. The chosen standard
of review is not a t issue here. For purposes of this article, the
significant move of the state court was that it declined to employ the strict scrutiny standard under its own constitution and

153.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 799 P.2d 148 (Or. 1990) (on remand to the Oregon Supreme Court after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt.
1990).
154.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 799 P.2d 148 (Or. 1990). Oregon originally denied compensation because the unemployment compensation statute was facially
neutral, and generally .applicable. The U.S. Supreme Court would deny compensation because the criminal statute was facially neutral and generally applicable.
155.
The Vermont Constitution states:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right, to worship Almighty
God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings, as in their opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and that
no man ought to, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious
worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of his conscience, nor can any man be justly
deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his
religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no
authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the
rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship.
VT. CONST.ch. 1, art. 3.
577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990).
156.

2751

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

309

instead employed it under Smith.
Iowa might be considered the third state to have adopted
the Smith analysis under its own constitution, yet this remains
unclear. Unlike Oregon and Vermont, each of which stated that
its state constitution would not provide for a higher standard of
judicial review in free exercise cases, the Iowa Supreme Court's
opinion in Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church u. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance makes no such statement? In
this case a church challenged a use tax assessment on the
purchase of out-of-state church supplies on both federal and
state constitutional grounds. Interestingly, the language of free
exercise protection in the Iowa Constitution is identical to that
of the First Amendment.lss However, after reproducing the
language of both constitutions, the court proceeded to uphold
the assessment as a valid exercise of state taxing authority on
wholly federal grounds without separately analyzing the state
constitutional pro~ision.'~~
Thus, the court relied exclusively
on federal precedent to find that compliance with this generally
applicable, facially neutral tax law was no different from cornpliance with other generally applicable, facially neutral laws.
This case is a classic example of a court's failure to clarify
whether its judgment rests on federal grounds alone or on both
state and federal grounddg If the Iowa court intended to interpret its state constitutional provision to be coextensive with
the federal interpretation, then Iowa could be added to those
states refusing to find a higher standard of review in their
fundamental law. On the other hand, the lack of clarity regarding the specific constitutional basis for its decision could mean
that it still retains the opportunity to make an independent
judgment about free exercise under its own constitution in
areas outside the tax field.
463 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1585 (1991).
The Iowa Constitution reads as follows:
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall any person be
compelled to attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates
for building or repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of any
minister or ministry.
IOWA CONST. art. I, 9 3.
159. The court applied the Supreme Court's Swaggart analysis to reject the free
exercise claim in this case. Hope, 463 N.W.2d a t 80 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)). Although Swaggart is applied
(because of the factual similarities), Smith is mentioned. Id.
160.
See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.

157.
158.
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B. States Departing fiorn Smith's Minim1 Scrutiny
Minnesota and Washington have adopted the federal language of "compelling state interesty'and "least restrictive alternative" to interpret their provisos. Only the state's interest in
preventing licentiousness and ensuring peace and safety can
override religious freedom, which mirrors Sherbert's requirement that there be a compelling state interest to override free
exercise rights. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
Minnesota's citizens are "afforded greater protection for religious liberties against governmental action under the state
constitution than under the first amendment of the federal
constitution" because the federal language precludes only the
"prohibition" of free exercise, while the state language "precludes an infringement on or an interference with religious
freedom and limits the permissible countervailing interests of
the g~vernment."'~~
In applying these notions to actual cases, the Minnesota
Supreme Court employs a highly structured balancing analysis.
For example, in Hershberger 11, Amish citizens sought exemption from the state's "slow-moving vehicle" law?' Rather
than place an orange triangle on their buggies, the Amish
(whose religious convictions prevent them from using gaudy
colors and symbols) requested that they be permitted to outline
their buggies in silver reflecting tape. The state conceded that
the reflecting tape was equally suitable for safety, but wanted
to preserve uniformity. The court did not simply accept the
assertion by the state that safety was involved to override the
denial of a religious exemption. It had indicated in Cooper v.
French that the "plain language" of the proviso "commands
[the] court to weigh the competing interest^."'^^ The court
borrowed this "weighing" analysis from federal free exercise
precedent, stating that the proviso "invites the court to balance
competing values in a manner that the compelling state interest test we relied on [earlier] ably articulates: . . . the state
should be required to demonstrate that public safety cannot be
achieved by proposed alternative means."lM If any accommodation can be reached through the use of a less restrictive al161.
162.
163.
164.

State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
Id. For procedural history, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990).
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 398.
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ternative that will enable both the religious interest and the
state interest to be protected, such an accommodation must be
accepted.lB5Only if the state can show that safety cannot be
achieved through any less restrictive alternative will the religious liberty interest yield. In the strictest sense then, to infringe permissibly upon a religious practice, the practice must
be fully inconsistent with public safety.lB6
In a plurality opinion in Cooper u. French, the Minnesota
Supreme Court also upheld the rights of a landlord to deny an
apartment to a n unmarried cohabiting couple on the grounds
that such a rental would violate the landlord's religious
conviction^.'^' The court held that protecting cohabitation
was not a compelling interest sufficient to override the
landlord's religious exercise.
The Washington Supreme Court also interprets its proviso
to mean that religious practice can be outweighed only by a
compelling state interest implemented through the least rea church
strictive alternative. In First Covenant Church II,lB8
challenged the designation of the exterior of its house of worship as a landmark. The court found that the designation did
indeed burden religious practice under both the federal and
state constitutions and that historic preservation did not embody a compelling governmental interest suMicient to justify
the burden. 16'
Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme Court, in his
concurring opinion in First Covenant Church II, was concerned

165. Id. at 399.
166. Minnesota vigorously develops the least-restrictive-alternative element of the
strict scrutiny standard. Before a compelling interest can interfere with free exercise, the religious practice must be filly inconsistent with the state's interest. Any
accommodation of both religious practice and the state's goal must be accepted.
This shares similarities with the analysis of Kentucky and T e ~ e s s e e .See supra
notes 132-134 and accompanying text. A required choice of the least restrictive
alternative leads Kentucky to grant broad autonomy to church schools, and calls on
Tennessee's Supreme Court to analyze numerous alternatives to the outright prohibition on snake handling before making its final determination.
167. Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
168. 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). For procedural history, see supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text.
169. The Washington Supreme Court relied on an earlier state case to determine
what constitutes a compelling state interest. See State ex rel. Holcomb v.
Armstrong, 239 P.2d 545, 548 (Wash. 1952) (only a danger which is "clear and
present, grave and immediate" justifies infringement of free exercise of religion,
where government's interest in protecting specified persons from disease outweighs
individual's right to refuse an x-ray).
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that the court had unnecessarily adopted federal concepts of
compelling state interest and least restrictive alternative, and
even the concept of "balancing." He emphasized that the specific language of the Washington Constitution expressly limited
the governmental interests that may outweigh the otherwise
absolute right to liberty: preventing licentiousness and ensuring peace and safety. Since historic preservation involves neither interest of the state, the court need not reach the issue of
whether the state's interest is ~ompelling.'~~
While this interpretive method did not command a majority in Washington, it did in Massachusetts. Massachusetts'
constitutional proviso precludes government interference with
religious freedom unless the religious practice disturbs the
public peace or obstructs others in their religious worship. In
Society of Jesus u. Boston Landmarks Commi~sion,'~'the Jesuits challenged the designation of the interior of their church
as a landmark. The historic preservation commission had become involved in the placement of altars; because of this, the
Jesuits claimed a constitutional violation. In agreeing that the
state constitution was violated, the high court set out a twotiered test. If government is found to have restrained worship
"in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of
conscience," the court looks to see if the religiously motivated
conduct disturbs the peace or the worship of others. If it does
not, the government regulation must yield. Therefore, the
Massachusetts Constitution provides a categorical prohibition
against governmental restraints of religious worship when the
"escape clauses" are inapplicable.'" This is very similar to
Washington Supreme Court Justice Utter's suggested app r 0 a ~ h . lThe
~ ~ Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court went
on to say that in the event the religious practice does disturb
the peace or the worship of others, the court is required to
engage in a balancing of the religious and state interest^.'?^
Note again the sensitivity to religion: even when the proviso is
applicable, the state regulation may still be required to yield.

170. First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 191-92 (Utter, J., concurring).
171.
564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
172. Id. at 574.
173. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
174.
The constitutionality of a law that would interfere with the exercise of
religion must depend on a balancing of the State's interest in the law's enforcement against the individual's interest in practicing his religion as he chooses."
Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Mass. 1989).
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Moreover, although no balance was required under its test, the
court nonetheless offered its judgment that state historic presly
to justify restraints on
ervation "is not ~ ~ c i e n t compelling
the free exercise of religi~n."'~~
The Maine Supreme Court's discussion of its state constitunot as fully developed
tion in Rupert u. City of P ~ r t l a n d 'is~ ~
as in these other decisions because in Rupert the religious
claimant lost. The plaintiff argued that he smoked marijuana
only for religious purposes, and therefore sought return of the
pipe that police had confiscated from him. The court continued
t o employ the language developed in the Sherbert federal context, finding under its state constitution that Maine had a
compelling governmental interest and no less restrictive alternative that would avoid the burden placed on plaintiff.17' Under its separate federal analysis, the Court held that the state
satisfies Smith's lower standard because the criminal statute
under which the pipe was taken is generally applicable.17'
The California Supreme Court currently faces the question
of what standard of review t o employ in free exercise cases. In
Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, a landlord refused to rent to an unmarried, cohabiting couple.179
The couple sued under rent discrimination laws. The appellate
court held that a religious exemption from those laws was
required under the state constitution because religion was
burdened and because non-discrimination against unmarried
cohabitors is not a compelling state interest justifymg the burden.lsoThe appellate court also found that prior to Smith, the
California Supreme Court had repeatedly used the compelling
interest test based upon both federal and state constitutional
grounds and had considered the interpretations of state and
federal free exercise coextensive. The appellate court held that
despite the change in federal interpretation after Smith, the
pre-Smith compelling interest test (which incorporates the least
175. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 574.
176. 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
177. Id. at 66-67.
178. Id. at 67-68.
179. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991), reh'g granted & opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (1992). The Donahue
case is factually identical to Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), in
which a plurality opinion of the state's high court rejected Smith and applied its
own constitutional law to find protection for religion that explicitly exceeded the
federal level.
180. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
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restrictive alternative requirement) continues to be the controlling analysis under state constitutional law.lgl
One of the most significant aspects of this independent
religious exercise jurisprudence, both during the Sherbert years
(in Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi and Maine) and in the
post-Smith period (in Minnesota, Massachusetts, Maine and
Washington), is the more sophisticated treatment of religious
activity than in the federal arena. After Sherbert and its immediate progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court became increasingly
wooden i n its applications of the Sherbert approach, understanding "burden" in overly narrow terms, or too readily fmding a compelling state interest. Often the institutional and
associational aspects of religion were not fully appreciated a s
something to be protected.ls2 In addition, Smith's rejection of
judicially mandated religious exemptions has completely ignored the dynamic interaction between church and culture, and
thus -threatens the ability of religious groups to make the theological choice of the appropriate type of interaction with the
culture, whether friendly, critical, engaged, or withdrawn.1g3
State interpretation has been far more hospitable to these
associational and ecclesiological issues and generally more open
to the complexity of religion and the variety of its forms. Most
significantly, in none of the state cases is religion understood
as narrowly as it came to be in federal cases-that is, as obedience to a set of rules. Rather, most of the state cases address
group rights: the free exercise rights of churches to design their
buildings, inside and out, free of historic preservation restrictions (Washington, Massachusetts); the free exercise rights
of the Amish to use alternative safety measures when riding
their buggies in public streets (Minnesota); and the free exercise rights of church schools to choose their own teachers and
textbooks (Kentucky). These cases have taken the integrity of
the religious community as a paramount value. Even the snake

181.
Id. a t 39-41. "The California Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
application of Smith. Unless the California Supreme Court adopts the approach in
Smith, even if we found the approach in Smith preferable, we are bound to continue to follow the balancing test and compelling state interest analysis as a matter
of state constitutional law." Id. a t 40.
182. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7, a t 537 (advocating a "structural" approach to religious liberty that accounts for the "institutional and associational, as
well a s the individual, aspects of religious freedom").
183. See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60 GEO.WASH. L. REV.782, 784-95 (1992).
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handlers of Tennessee, whose practice was ultimately held
unlawful, were given the most careful attention. Moreover,
state courts have recognized and protected manifestations of
religious life that are deeply connected with the wider society.
For example, Minnesota and California have permitted landlords to refuse rentals to cohabiting couples, thereby protecting
religious liberty in a commercial context.'"
States now have the opportunity to engage in the interpretation of their own constitutions and thus to enter the decisional dialogue with other state and federal courts, not only to
"restore" the pre-Smith standard, but to reshape it as well. In
so doing, state constitutional interpretation might avoid some
of the weaknesses of the pre-Smith jurisprudence, in particular
its overly narrow interpretation of burden and its overly generous interpretation of compelling state interest.lS5State constitutional interpretation has the potential to better address the
associational and institutional aspects of free exercise,1s6and
thus might ensure that the church-culture interaction, and the
ecclesiological judgments that flow from that interaction, are
better protected from unwarranted governmental interference.lg7

C. Encouraging Departure fron Smith
This article has emphasized the use of provisos as textual
sources of "compelling governmental interest" requirements (or
of some other interpretation that limits the types of state interests that can override religious exercise). This emphasis, however, is not intended t o suggest that interpretive independence
is limited to states with provisos. More than half of the states
in the nation have no such language, and other states, like
Iowa, have texts mirroring the federal language. Even without
proviso language, textual differences alone provide a tremendous source of independent interpretation. Such was the case
in Tennessee and Kentucky, which, during the Sherbert years,
184. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991), reh'g granted & opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (1992); Cooper v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990).
185. For discussion of some of those weaknesses, see Glendon & Yanes, supra
note 7; see also Carmella, supra note 183, at 795-99.
Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7, focus on these aspects of free exercise. For
186.
many examples of the ways in which state constitutional interpretation can more
authentically serve all areas of the law, see Hartigan, supra note 78, passim.
187. See Carmella, supra note 17.
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found an independent basis for strict scrutiny.188As for those
states whose language mirrors that of the Federal Free Exercise Clause, nothing precludes them from making an independent analysis. Three years ago the federal language was interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to require strict scrutiny
review; simply because the Court has departed from the earlier
understanding does not compel the states to follow suit. Here
the debate between relational and non-relational approaches to
state court interpretation becomes significant: a non-relational
approach affords state courts the appropriate freedom to give
meaning to their texts independent of federal choices.18sThe
states with provisos may be the leaders in the movement to
depart from Smith, but nothing prevents the interpretive autonomy of other states.
States yet to make a decision about Smith should not fear
that a lack of interpretive autonomy in the past compels them
now t o follow federal precedent. Minnesota and Massachusetts
never exhibited interpretive independence before Smith; Washington did, but in a very limited way. The fact that the states'
interpretations of their own constitutions are shaped by the
Sherbert analysis leads more persuasively t o the conclusion
that the Sherbert analysis remains the state constitutional
interpretation, even though the current federal interpretation
has changed. To conclude otherwise would mean that any
change by the U.S. Supreme Court automatically amends state
constitutions and their interpretations.lS0 As Justice
188. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. See also Miller & Sheers,
supra note 36, at 311-18, for a comprehensive discussion of available textual arguments.
189. See Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, at 311-18.
190. Thanks to Professor Laycock for this observation. This is precisely the mistake the Vermont Supreme Court made in State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt.
1990). The court discussed constitutions and cases from more than a dozen states,
which, at first glance, looks like a rather sophisticated treatment of texts from
sister states. But upon closer review, it serves to make only one point: during the
Sherbert years, state religious exercise provisions were typically understood as
coextensive with the Federal Free Exercise Clause. It concludes unnecessarily from
this fad that it therefore should now continue to follow the federal analysis and
not invoke its own constitution. But it could have concluded just as easily that if
its own constitution has been understood to support a strict scrutiny standard in
the past, now that the federal doctrine has changed, it can continue to understand
its state constitution to require strict scrutiny. Its analysis of sister states is further undermined because two states it placed on its listMinnesota and
Maine-have explicitly departed from the federal standard since Smith. See supra
notes 21-37 and accompanying text. In fad, Maine had already established an
independent standard, but the Vermont Supreme Court misread Blount v. Depart-
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Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote,
The United States Supreme Court, by defining liberties in a
more limited manner, cannot prevent future decisions by
state supreme courts that interpret state constitutions to go
further. If this were true, the Supreme Court would effectively be the final arbiter, not only of federal constitutional law,
but of much state constitutional law. Yet both the Supreme
Court and this Court have consistently rejected this position. lQ1

Minnesota gave no indication during the Sherbert years
that it might depart from federal precedent. After In re Jenison
was remanded in 1963, M i ~ e s o t afollowed the lead set by the
U.S. Supreme Court, either interpreting its own constitution i n
tandem with the federal interpretation or ignoring it completely. In fact, Hershberger I was based solely on the First Amendment.lg2 Only a dissenting opinion in a 1985 decision argued
for a more expansive protection of free exercise rights under
the state constitution on the grounds that the text of
Minnesota's provision is stronger.lg3
Similarly, Massachusetts had no prior history of departing
from Supreme Court precedent in the free exercise area. In
fact, Justice Wilkins of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court wrote in 1980 that "[tlhe pervasive impact of the Supreme Court's treatment of the freedom of religion under the
first amendment seemingly has made unnecessary any consideration of the scope of article 2 in recent decades."lN As late
as 1989 its high court wrote that federal analysis
aids us in analyzing the scope of religious freedom under our
own Constitution . . . . While it is possible that, in the future,
we may conclude that there are circumstances in which art. 2
provides protection for religious practices not protected by the

ment of Education & Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988).
191. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 948-49 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the speech context, see State v. Schmid,
423 A.2d 615 (N.J.1980); in the unlawful search context, see State v. Hunt, 450
A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
192. State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Mim. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901
(1990). See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
193. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 873-75 (Minn. 1985)
(Peterson, J., dissenting).
194. Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Deatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 887, 897 (1980).
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First Amendment as construed and applied by Federal courts,
we perceive nothing in the language or history of art. 2 that
suggests that art. 2 affords more protection in connection with
[the religious practice in this case] than does the First
Amendment.19'

Washington has a history of sensitivity to its own constitutional provisions in the immediate post-incorporation era. In
1943, when a Jehovah's Witness flag-salute case came before it,
the Washington Supreme Court decided emphatically not to
follow the U.S. Supreme Court's example in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis.lg6Washington's decision in Bolling v. Superior Courtlg7came down nearly six months before West Virginia Board of Education u. Barnettelg8 overruled Gobitis.
The Washington Supreme Court was aware that support for
Gobitis had eroded on the U.S. Supreme Court, that the federal
district court in Barnette had refused to recognize Gobitis as
controlling, and that the Kansas Supreme Court had recently
found expanded religious protection under its own constitution.lg9 Rather than anticipate a federal turnaround, however, the state court based its decision solely on its state constitutional protections in order to announce a decision that would be
stable and final despite fluctuations a t the federal level. After
this case, Washington followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme
Court, interpreting its own constitution in tandem with the
federal interpretation, but it continued to provide a robust
interpretation of free exercise within the federal framework. In
its 1982 decision in City of Sumner v. First Baptist
for instance, the state's highest court required the type of accommodation that Minnesota demanded in Hershberger 11: if
any accommodation can be reached through the use of a less
restrictive alternative that will serve both the religious interest
and the state interest, it must be accepted. Relying heavily on

195. Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Mass. 1989).
196. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
197. 133 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1943).
198. 319 U S . 624 (1943).
199. The Washington Supreme Court said in Bolling, "Under all the circumstances, [Gobitis] can scarcely be deemed to have become authoritative." Bolling, 133
P.2d at 808.
200. 639 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1982). Enforcement of the building code against the
church school would have resulted in its closing. The court therefore held that the
municipality must attempt to accommodate the church school by relaxing its standards while still meeting the goals of fire safety for children.
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Sumner, the court in First Covenant Church I based its decision in favor of the church on a single, vigorous interpretation
of both the First Amendment and article 1, section 11.201
Thus, on the eve of Smith, only Maine had explicitly articulated a separate standard of review under its own constituMassachusetts, and Washington had ast i ~ n . ~Minnesota,
'~
sumed that their state free exercise protection was redundant
and coextensive with that of the federal constitution. This is
the current position of thirty-five states?O3 all of which possess the interpretive autonomy to depart from Smith, just as
these states have done.
AND ESTABLISHMENT
CONCEPTS:
VI. FREEEXERCISE
STATEAND FEDERAL

Professor Mary Ann Glendon and Raul Yanes have written
about the need to analyze the relationships within and among
texts.204Applying their concerns to the issues raised in this
article, one must analyze developments in state free exercise
jurisprudence in relation to establishment texts within the
state document. The same analysis is also needed when considering the relationship between state and federal texts. A
vigorous expansion of religious exemptions under a strict SCNtiny standard of judicial review is, I submit, fully compatible
with these other texts.
State courts have -been far more comfortable departing
from federal precedent in the area of state establishment provisions than their analyses of free exercise suggest.205Since
states have had considerable experience in developing their
own jurisprudence in the establishment area, they ought not be
reluctant t o do the same in the free exercise area. In fact, the
major implication of independent interpretation of state religion provisions is the opportunity to develop a comprehensive
and coherent religious liberty doctrine, one which integrates

201.
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash.), vacated,
111 S. Ct. 1097 (1990). See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
202. Maine was among the handfbl of states that held during the Sherbert years
that its own constitution required the burdenhmpelling interestfleast restrictive
alternative test; but this decision was rendered quite recently-1988. Blount v.
Department of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988).
203. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
204. See generally Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7.
205. See FREIsEN, supra note 45, $5 4.01-4.05.
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the treatment of free exercise and establishment issues.206
The language of the state constitutional texts clearly suggests such a n integrated analysis. In fact, the wording and
placement of establishment provisions in state constitutions
show that they were intended to promote freedom of religious
exercise. They do this by prohibiting compulsory church attendance, compulsory support of ministers or places of worship,
state preferences for particular sects, societies or denominations, and state support for any particular creed, mode of worship or system of ecclesiastical polity.207In addition, although
the provisions provide tax exemptions for religious organizations, they also prohibit public funds from going directly to
religious organizations, societies or
The U.S. Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education referred to these
issues as "establishment" concerns, ignoring their important
role in protecting voluntary religious exercise.20g

206.
Tarr, supra note 6, at 77-78.
207.
Id. at 85-86.
208.
In addition to the "no compelled church attendance/support of minister" and
"no-preference" language, most state constitutions were amended in the nineteenth
century to bar the use of public funds for any religious institution, society, or
school and to prevent the public schools from being used for sectarian purposes.
This resulted from the anti-Catholic sentiment of the time and ensured the continued Protestant hegemony. See Laycock, Summary, supra note 15, at 845; Tam,
supra note 149, at 67-68.
209.
330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court wrote:
The "establishment of religion clause* of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). The
Court captures these limits on state action under the "establishment" rubric since
these were precisely the types of abuses of personal liberties caused by governments that had an established church. But these are, at bottom, "free exercise"
concerns. If I am compelled to pay for a church my free exercise has been burdened by the state's established religion because in the free exercise of my religion
I may choose to support another church or no church at all. The establishment is
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The language of most state constitutions does not separate
the establishment provisions from the freedom of worship, conscience, and religious exercise provision^.^" For most, in fact,
the provisions are so interconnected that to name some "establishment" and others "free exercise" artificially divides unified
concerns and imports the federal problem of the "tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses."211 Because of the variety of textual sources for the protection of religious exercise and for non-establishment, some states have not
been overly concerned with categorizing a case under the label
of "free exercise" or "establishment" so as to limit themselves to
one or the other body of case law.212Sometimes state courts
even jump back and forth between the federal analysis of one
concept and the state analysis of another.213 Precisely because the texts of state constitutions weave together and overlap their free exercise and establishment provisions (as opposed
to creating neatly divided categories in theoretical tension with
each other), a greater possibility exists for developing coherent
and comprehensive religious liberty doctrines at the state level.
Professor Tarr suggests that "given the greater specificity of
state constitutional guarantees, such tensions [between establishment and free exercise concepts] are less likely to arise.
Certainly, they have not yet arisen . . . ."214
The history of independent interpretation of state establishment provisions suggests that the main prohibition is
against institutional support or aid to religion.215 From this
the state's action that burdens free exercise, but there is no "compelling state interest" to have an established church because the Establishment Clause has forbidden it.
210.
See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
211.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
212.
See, e.g., Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978) (holding
cross on city hall unconstitutional under California Constitution, violating both the
no-preference and establishment provisions).
213.
See, e.g., Heritage Village Church .& Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State,
263 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. 1980), where the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the
Federal Establishment Clause test because it read state freedom-of-conscience and
no-religious-discrimination provisions together with federal establishment as
" 'coalesding] into a singular guarantee of [the] . . . principle of separation of
church and state.' " Id. at 730 (quoting Braswell v. Purser, 193 S.E.2d 90, 93 (N.C.
1972).
214.
Tarr, supra note 6, at 78.
215.
After incorporation in the 1940s, and to the present, "some state courts
followed the [U.S. Supreme Court's] results and reasoning in interpreting and applying diverse state clauses. Others continued to issue independent interpretations
and some rejected the Supreme Court's lead." FREISEN,supra note 45, 5 4.01. Pro-
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institutional emphasis,'16 Professor Tarr concludes that governmental accommodation of religion is constitutional as long
as it does not involve favoritism, monetary aid, or interference
with religious freedom.217Thus, at the state level, there is
room for the development of a coherent understanding of manvisions regarding no compelled attendance or support of a church and no
preference rarely serve' as the basis of stricter interpretation. In fact, states interpreting the no-preference clauses typically find that they are either less strict than
the federal standard or consistent with the federal analysis of the Everson-Lemon
line of cases. See, e.g., Clayton v. Kervick, 267 A.2d 503, 506, 528 (N.J.1970)
("Our state provision is less pervasive, literally, than the federal provision. Hence
our discussion will be limited to the federal provision as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court."), vacated, 403 U.S. 945 (1971); see also FREISEN,supra
note 45, 5 4.03; Fritz, supra note 40, at 58-60 (indicating that in most cases the
state equates federal and state provisions, despite differences in text, and therefore
has same interpretation of no-preference clause as Establishment Clause in Federal
Constitution). Some states have developed the no-preference doctrine into one of
equal access to ensure that religious as well as secular groups are eligible for
government aid generally available for public purposes. See, e.g., Fort Sanders
Presbyterian Hosp. v. Health & Educ. Facilities Bd., 453 S.W.2d 771 (T~M. 1970)
(finding the no-preference provision of the state constitution to mean that state aid
to religiously affiliated institutions was constitutional when available on equal
footing with secular and educational institutions as part of a general program
fostering a public purpose).
Specific no-aid provisions from the nineteenth century have been the source of
most independent interpretation that goes beyond the federal interpretation to
strike permissible accommodations of religion. See FREEEN, supra note 45, $ 4.05;
Note, supra note 111, at 639-40. Of fifteen states interpreting these no-aid provisions, twelve have been interpreted more broadly than the Federal Establishment
Clause. Id. a t 640. "These 'no aid' clauses are unique to state constitutions, and
have frequently required invalidation of state financial aid programs that would be
tolerated by the first amendment." FREISEN,supra note 45, 3 4.01. A Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court justice has gone so far as to assert that the "restrictive impact of [the Massachusetts anti-aid provision] has rendered the federal antiestablishment provision relatively insignificant in certain respects." Wilkins, supra
note 194, at 897. The no-aid provisions have therefore given the state courts the
right to limit governmental accommodation of religion more severely than is required at the federal level.
216.
Professor Tarr indicates
Early state constitutions did not seek to circumscribe the influence of religion in society or to eliminate religious influence on government but rather to prevent governmental intrusion into the religious sphere . . . . State
courts continued to recognize Christianity as part of the common law and
to sustain convictions for blasphemy when speakers disparaged Christian
beliefs . . . . Thus, state constitutions were interpreted so as to protect
Christianity and to enforce the prevailing, Protestant consensus."
Tarr, supra note 149, at 67. Constitutions were not neutral; they were very much
in favor of religion as long as no preference was shown to a particular religious
group, no money aid was given to any religious groups, and the recognition of
religion did not interfere with anyone else's freedom of belief and worship. Id. at
73.
217.
Tarr, supm note 6, at 105-06.
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datory and permissible accommodations. Aggressive exemptions
of religious practice, resulting from the use of a strict scrutiny
review of laws burdening religion, are fully compatible with
this institutional separation-both protect the i n t L ~ t yof religi~n.~l~
A return to strict scrutiny a t the state level is completely
compatible not only with establishment provisions within state
texts, but with the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. Smith provides a low standard
of review which the states are free to exceed with the use of
their own strict scrutiny standard. The Federal Establishment
Clause does not preclude this for several reasons. First, Smith
itself retains strict scrutiny review for several categories of
cases. Moreover, Smith did not overrule any earlier free exercise cases, and its adoption of a lower standard was not related
to any developments in establishment jurisprudence. Second,
religious exemptions have repeatedly been held constitutiona1219 and are clearly permissible when they are "designed to
-

The f a d that the opportunity for coherent jurisprudential development ex218.
ists does not mean it has been achieved. Washington's tradition of independence in
the no-aid area and more recent independence in the free exercise area illustrate
some inconsistencies. In Witters v. State, 689 P.2d 53 (Wash. 1984), the state high
court refused to consider Larry Witters' study for the ministry religious exercise
because it was not mandatory. The Washington Supreme Court held unconstitutional, under the Federal Establishment Clause, the availability of public funding for
Larry Witters, under a general program of funding education for the blind, because
he planned to use the money to study for the ministry. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, explaining that this particular form of aid was a permissible accommodation. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1985). But
the Court refused to hold that the Federal Free Exercise Clause required the result:
On remand, the state court is of course free to consider the applicability
of the "far stricter" dictates of the Washington State Constitution . . . .
We decline [Witters'] invitation to leapfrog consideration of those issues
by holding that the Free Exercise Clause requires Washington to extend
vocational rehabilitation aid to [Witters] regardless of what the State
Constitution commands.
Id. a t 489 (citations omitted). Practically a t the invitation of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Washington high court, on remand, reinstated its original holding, this
time on the grounds that the aid was unconstitutional on state non-establishment
grounds. 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). This
plainly contradicts the broad understanding of religious exercise in First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097
(1990). Definitional inconsistencies must be resolved or explained if the integrity of
religious conduct is to find protection in state texts.
219.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); Empioyment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
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alleviate governmental intrusions on [religious practices]."z20
State court decisions to exempt religious behavior from generally applicable laws are, by definition, based upon a determination that a burden on religious practice must be alleviated. If
general legislative exemptions are welcomed in both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence without any specific showing by religious claimants of a burden then all the
more reason to welcome court-mandated exemptions issued
after careful review of the burden and state interests a t stake.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has never reversed a state
supreme court for giving too much protection to religious exercise under its own constitution. In fact, the two occasions on
which it has reversed state court decisions based on state constitutional interpretations have involved states which violated
the First Amendment because they were trying t o avoid violating state (and federal) establishment pro~isions.~~'
States choosing to employ a strict scrutiny standard of
review can serve to engender dialogue on the meaning of religious liberty among state courts and between state and federal
courts. But meaningful dialogue will require proponents of the
non-relational and relational approaches to compromise on
their methodology. State-first theorists should acknowledge the
damage Smith has caused and will continue to cause t o the free
exercise of religion; they must be willing to look seriously at
the gap in substantive protection that this decision has created
at the federal level. Likewise, federal-first theorists should not
underestimate the profound interpretive independence available under state constitutions and the urgent need to mine
those state constitutions as sources of rights in the post-Smith
period.

220.
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8. See Michael W . McCo~ell,Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.WASH.
L. REV.
685, 696-708 (1992).
221.
In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the T e ~ e s s e eConstitution disqualified ministers from legislative positions. The state legislature applied this
provision to candidates for delegate to the T e ~ e s s e elimited mnstitutional convention in 1977 in a separate statute, "[alny citizen of the state who can qualify for
membership in the House of Representatives . . . may become a candidate for
delegate to the convention." Id. at 621. The Supreme Court held this attempt to
ensure no state establishment violated the Free Exercise Clause. Similarly, Missouri argued in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US. 263 (1981), that if the state university
permited a religious group to meet on campus it would be violating the establishment provisions of the federal and state constitutions. The US. Supreme Court
held that this violated federal free speech protections. Id. at 276-77.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Professor Emily Fowler Hartigan has written,
[State constitutions are] being interpreted into being in fifty
different states. The "new federalism" has an unpredictable
reality, which does not neatly follow anyone's political agenda.
It has the means for authenticity; i t practices the core virtue
of American local government, participation. . . . We are taking back our texts, living our laws.

....

In our federal constitutional jurisprudence, we have
forgotten what gives life to the reading of the text and the
commentary on the text. . . . [But with state constitutions1
new ways of talking and reclamation of fundamental law
have loosed new streams of life-giving spirit to enflesh the
"mere skeleton[sl" of the words of

While it may be too soon to determine whether the emerging post-Smith decisional law is a n authentic act of "taking
back our texts," several themes-or at least their rough outlines-emerge from it. The foregoing has shown how the free
exercise texts in many state constitutions refer explicitly to
multiple dimensions of religious exercise, explicitly limit the
state's authority in the area of religious exercise, and explicitly
acknowledge that the state is not the ultimate source of authority. By reclaiming those texts, state courts courageous enough
to depart from Smith can provide robust protection for religious
liberty through strict limits on the government's ability to interfere in religious exercise. What appear to be arising from
this emerging state jurisprudence are a more authentic definition of religious liberty, a more genuine application of the compelling interest standard, and new, clearer textual bases for the
definition of a compelling state interest. Taken together, these
factors may portend a new atmosphere of respect for religious
liberty.

-

222.

Hartigan, supra note 78, at 273-74 (footnotes omitted).

